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AbsTRAcT
The notion of Reconquista is the product of 19th-century Spanish Nationalist 
thinking. Although developed as an academic concept, it played, at the same time, 
a crucial political and ideological role, thus holding a very powerful and potentially 
toxic ideological burden, chiefly consisting of the idea that Spain is a nation shaped 
against Islam. Its dual academic and ideological nature makes it a highly problematic 
concept that greatly contributed to produce a largely biased and distorted vision of 
the Iberian medieval past, aimed at delegitimizing the Islamic presence (al-Andalus) 
and therefore at legitimizing the Christian conquest of the Muslim territory. Over the 
last years and in the framework of the Clash of Civilizations doctrine, conservative 
and far-right scholarly and political outlets reignited the most ideological version of 
the Reconquista, thus raising a major challenge for academic historians.
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1. Introduction1
On last December 2nd, 2018, former grand wizard of the KKK, David Duke, 
tweeted out the following:2 “VOX triumphs in Andalusia! 12 seats and the end of 
the socialist regime #EspañaViva makes it history and shows that change is possible. 
The Reconquista begins in the Andalusian lands and will be extended in the rest of 
Spain”.
Exceeding all predictions, Vox took 12 seats in the aforementioned election, 
becoming the first far-right organization to triumph at the ballot box since Spain’s 
return to democracy after the death of Franco in 1975. As we shall see below, Vox 
has constantly invoked the idea of Reconquista over the last years. Given the recent 
results in the Andalusia elections, the strategy seems to have paid off well.
Both the political repurposing of the idea of Reconquista by Vox and Duke’s tweet 
point out to the same fact: the far right’s increasing fascination with the Middle 
Ages, an issue that has been widely discussed in the media over the last years. 
At the same time, this subject has been considerably enlivened in recent scholarly 
publications, such as books by Bruce Holsinger3 and Andrew Elliott.4
As Sarah Pearce pointed out in a thoughtful opinion piece published in The 
Washington Post, “These movements share more than political goals: They share 
an attachment to an imagined medieval past”.5 The recent reintroduction of the 
Reconquista rhetoric in the political conversation has become a global phenomenon, 
as Duke’s tweet clearly suggests. For this reason, Spain comes as an excellent case 
study to approach this subject. What makes the Reconquista different is not just its 
recent repurposing by various conservative political and scholarly outlets, but also 
its long-standing and solid scholarly track record.
1. This text represents the earliest outcome of my research stay at the Institute for Advanced Study 
(Princeton) over the Spring of 2019. I am very grateful to the Institute for its support to carry out my 
research. I am also indebted to Seth Kimmel (Columbia University), Mayte Green-Mercado (Rutgers 
University), and Fernando Bravo López (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) for their comments and 
suggestions. All possible mistakes are my own.
2. @DrDavidDuke. “VOX triumphs in Andalusia! 12 seats and the end of the socialist regime #EspanaViva 
makes it history and shows that change is possible. The Reconquista begins in the Andalusian lands 
and will be extended in the rest of Spain #AndalucíaPorEspaña”, 3 December 2018: <https://twitter.
com/DrDavidDuke/status/1069370522000130049>. On Duke and his Islamophobic and anti-Semitic 
rhetoric, see Bravo López, Fernando. En casa ajena. Bases intelectuales del antisemitismo y la islamofobia. 
Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2012: 190-195.
3. Holsinger, Bruce. Neomedievalism, Neoconservatism, and the War on Terror. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm, 
2007.
4. Elliott, Andrew R. B. Medievalism, Politics and Mass Media. Appropriating the Middle Ages in the Twenty-first 
Century. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2017.
5. Pearce, Sarah. “The Medieval Fantasy that Fuels Israel’s Far Right”. The Washington Post, 1 March 
2019: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/03/01/medieval-fantasy-that-fuels-israels-
far-right/?utm_term=.7cac5c67787a>. See also Schuessler, Jennifer. “Medieval Scholars Joust with 
White Nationalists. And One Another”. The New York Times, 5 May 2019: <https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/05/05/arts/the-battle-for-medieval-studies-white-supremacy.html>.
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2. The origins of the notion of Reconquista
In a path-breaking study published nearly twenty years ago, Patrick Geary 
highlighted the narrow relationship between scholarship and nationalism.6 
However, and despite the rather obvious political and ideological features of the 
idea of Reconquista and its pervasive and abiding influence in Spanish scholarship, 
the relationship between ideology and academic history remains an ill-studied 
topic with regard to medieval Iberia, especially in Spain. The only monograph on 
this subject was published only four years ago and, significantly, it was carried out 
by a non-Spanish scholar. To my mind, the book by Patricia Hertel7 represents a 
good starting point in a subject that desperately calls for a much deeper and further 
development.8
A right understanding of the origins of the notion of Reconquista requires a careful 
look at the ideological context in which it was created. Among many other political, 
social and economic changes, liberalism brought the notion of national sovereignty. 
The new political subject, the nation, needed to be legitimized, and there is no 
better legitimator than the past. The nation thus was turned into the new historical 
subject and national histories swept through all European countries over the 19th 
century. The first Spanish Constitution of 1812 set forth the new right of national 
sovereignty: La soberanía reside esencialmente en la Nación, y por lo mismo pertenece a 
ésta exclusivamente el derecho de establecer sus leyes fundamentales (Title I, art. 3).9 At the 
same time, Catholicism was proclaimed as the only possible and perpetual religious 
faith of the Spanish nation (Title II, chapter 2, art. 12).10
Nationalism plagued with similar intensity the two main tendencies of 19th-
century scholarship, liberals, and conservatives. As pointed out by Modesto Lafuente 
6. Geary, Patrick J. The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002.
7. Hertel, Patricia. The Crescent Remembered. Islam and Nationalism on Medieval Iberia. Eastbourne: Sussex 
Academic Press, 2015. The significant role played by the Islamic past in Spanish nationalist thinking 
seems largely ignored by Núñez Seixas, Xosé M. Suspiros de España. El nacionalismo español 1808-2018. 
Barcelona: Crítica, 2018.
8. García Sanjuán, Alejandro. “Al-Andalus en la historiografía del nacionalismo españolista. Entre la 
España musulmana y la Reconquista (siglos XIX-XXI)”, A 1300 años de la conquista de al-Andalus. Historia, 
cultura y legado del islam en la península ibérica, Diego Melo Carrasco, Francisco Vidal Castro, eds. Coquimbo: 
Centro Mohammed VI para el diálogo de Civilizaciones, 2012: 65-104; García Sanjuán, Alejandro. 
“Al-Andalus en el nacionalcatolicismo español: la historiografía de época franquista (1939-1960)”, 
El franquismo y la apropiación del pasado, Francisco José Moreno Martín, ed. Madrid: Fundación Pablo 
Iglesias, 2017: 189-208; García-Sanjuán, Alejandro. “Rejecting al-Andalus, exalting the Reconquista: 
the persistence of an exclusionary historical memory in today’s Spain”, Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies, 
10/1 (2018): 127-145.
9. “In essence, sovereignty resides in the Nation, and therefore the right to stablish its fundamental laws 
belongs to the Nation”. Constitución política de la monarquia española. Cádiz: Imprenta real, 1812: 3.
10. La religión de la Nación española es y será perpetuamente la católica, apostólica, romana, única verdadera. La 
Nación la protege por leyes sabias y justas y prohíbe el ejercicio de cualquiera otra.  (“The religion of the Spanish 
Nation is and will be perpetually Catholic, Apostolic, Roman, the only true one. The Nation protects 
it by sacred and fair laws and prohibits the exercise of any other”). Constitución política de la monarquia 
española...: 6.
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(1806-1866), the finest representative of mainstream liberal historical writing, the 
Reconquista es cristiana y nacional.11 To a large extent, therefore, this notion stood 
for a common ground shared by both tendencies, and this cross-cutting character 
explains much of the scholarly success it reached. On the other hand, although both 
were equally Catholic in their leanings (as revealed by Lafuente), over time National 
Catholicism consolidated as the most conservative version of Spanish nationalism, 
peaking under Francoism which, not by accident, was likewise the heyday of the 
Reconquista, as we shall see below.
Late in the 19th century, the much-renowned scholar Marcelino Menéndez 
Pelayo (1856-1912) wrote the following: España, evangelizadora de la mitad del orbe; 
España martillo de herejes, luz de Trento, espada de Roma, cuna de San Ignacio (...); ésa 
es nuestra grandeza y nuestra unidad; no tenemos otra.12 As pointed out by J. Álvarez 
Junco, Catholicism and the nation were the same thing for Menéndez Pelayo.13 The 
notion according to which upholding and spreading the Catholic faith stands for 
the paramount historical achievement of the Spanish nation represents the basic 
underpinning of National Catholicism.14 Menéndez Pelayo was by far the most 
important scholarly figure of his time in the academic fields of history and Spanish 
language and literature. The consequences of the key-role played by Catholicism 
in 19th-century Spanish scholarship with regard to the reception of al-Andalus 
are not difficult to ascertain. If Spain as a nation represented the quintessence of 
Catholicism, what role was to be given to Islamic and Arab culture in the national 
narrative?
An accurate answer to that question may be found in the works of Francisco-
Javier Simonet (1829-1897), holder of the chair of Arabic in the University of 
Granada since 1862. An unshakable Catholic faith shaped most of his scholarship, 
thus representing the major driving force of his approach. Actually, he was not 
simply a faithful Catholic believer, but a convinced militant of Carlism, the most 
conservative political tendency in 19th-century Spain, mostly made up of anti-
liberals and supporters of absolutism and which provoked three wars between 1833 
and 1876. Simonet regularly contributed to El Siglo Futuro, a newspaper released 
between 1875 and 1936 which since 1886 became the official publication of the 
11. “The  ‘Reconquista’ was Christian and national”. Lafuente, Modesto. Historia general de España. Madrid: 
Establecimiento Tipográfico de Mellado, 1851: V, 444. On Lafuente and his concept of Reconquista, see 
Ríos Saloma, Martín. La Reconquista: una construcción historiográfica, siglos XVI-XIX. Madrid – Mexico City: 
Marcial Pons – Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2011: 210-220. According to Álvarez Junco, 
José. Mater dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX. Madrid: Taurus, 2001: 204, Lafuente repeatedly 
claimed the existence of divinely-originated permanent national features.
12. “Spain, evangelizer of half the world. Spain, hammer of heretics, light of Trent, sword of Rome, 
cradle of Saint Ignatius (...). This is our greatness and our unity, we have no other”. Menéndez Pelayo, 
Marcelino. Historia de los heterodoxos españoles, 3 vols. Madrid: La Editorial Católica, 1978: III, 658.  
13. Álvarez Junco, José. Mater dolorosa...: 463.
14. Botti, Alfonso. Cielo y dinero. El nacionalcatolicismo en España (1881-1975). Madrid: Alianza, 1992.
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so-called Integrist Party, founded by the most radical Carlist followers, those against 
any political engagement with the liberals.15
Simonet rose to prominence with the history of the so-called “mozarabs”, the 
Christians living under Muslim rule in Iberia. According to his approach, their 
steadfast and unflinching Catholic faith allowed them to endure the endless 
hardships of their subjection to Muslim rule.16 In this book, Simonet sketched the 
evolution of the medieval Iberian historical process as follows: Trabajada por muchos 
vicios y males en los últimos tiempos de la dominación visigoda, la nación española sucumbió a 
principios del siglo VIII, cayendo bajo el yugo de los musulmanes en que debía gemir por cerca 
de ocho siglos.17 It is thus hardly surprising that Simonet described time and again the 
Islamic conquest of Iberia in terms of “catastrophe”.18
The Arabist Eduardo Saavedra (1829-1912) espoused the same idea in Estudio 
sobre la invasión de los árabes en España (“Study about the invasion of the Arabs in 
Spain”), the first Spanish academic monograph on the origins of al-Andalus. In line 
with Simonet, he claimed that the arrival of Muslims to Iberia provoked la inmensa 
catástrofe nacional.19 This highly pessimistic approach to the expansion of Islam 
should not be regarded, however, as an exclusive feature of Spanish scholarship. 
In the context of his explanation on the end of Late Antiquity and the origins of 
the Middle Ages, the well-known Belgian historian Henri Pirenne (1862-1935) 
wrote: “The world-order which had survived the Germanic invasions was not able 
to survive the invasion of Islam. It is thrown across the path of history with the 
elemental force of a cosmic cataclysm”.20
If the catastrophist approach to the rise and expansion of Islam may be rightly 
considered as a mainstream feature of late 19th and early-20th-century European 
scholarship, the Spanish case, however, would be unique with regard to the 
influence of nationalism, which is key to understand the abiding tendency of 
Spanish historical writing to name the origins of al-Andalus in terms of ‘invasion’. 
At the same time, this role is equally crucial in order to correctly grasp the heavy 
ideological burden of the idea of Reconquista. 
15. On Simonet, see Monroe, James T. Islam and the Arabs in Spanish Scholarship (Sixteenth Century to the 
Present). Leiden: Brill, 1970: 85-100 and Manzanares de Cirre, Manuela. Arabistas españoles del siglo XIX. 
Madrid: Instituto Hispano Árabe de Cultura, 1979: 131-162.
16. López García, Bernabé. “Origen, gestión y divulgación de la Historia de los Mozárabes de Francisco 
Javier Simonet (con una bibliografía del Simonet publicista)”. Awraq, 22 (2001-2005): 183-212.
17. “Afflicted by many vices and hardships during the last years of Visigothic domination, the Spanish 
nation finally succumbed early in the 8th century, when it fell under the Muslims’ yoke and so it remained 
wailing for nearly eight centuries”. Simonet, Francisco Javier. Historia de los mozárabes españoles. Madrid: 
Real Academia de la Historia, 1897-1903: 1.
18. Simonet, Francisco Javier. Historia de los mozárabes españoles...: 14, 35, 122.
19. “A huge national catastrophe”. Saavedra, Eduardo. Estudio sobre la invasión de los árabes en España. 
Madrid: Imprenta de El Progreso Editorial, 1982: 1.
20. Pirenne, Henri. Medieval Cities. Their Origins and the Revival of Trade. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2014: 14.
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The 1994 book by Pedro Chalmeta stands for the most recent instance of this 
pervasive tendency21 and represents, at the same time, a singular case. Far from 
being a traditional historian, Chalmeta is openly anti-nationalist in his leanings and 
has been very vocal about traditional Spanish scholarship.22 His use of the notion 
of “invasion”, therefore, seems a clear case of unconscious bias which, at the same 
time, reveals that traditional concepts have been uncritically assumed in large 
sectors of Spanish scholarship, regardless of their respective ideological leanings.
A correct appraisal of the peculiar role played by the notion of ‘invasion’ in Spanish 
scholarship can only be reached against the background of a wider approach. A 
quick glance at other academic traditions reveals clear differences in the use of 
historical vocabulary. This is the case of 19th-century authors like Jules Lacroix de 
Màrles (d. 1850?)23 and Henry Coppee (1821-1895)24. The same holds true with 
regard to more recent scholars, like the British Roger Collins25 and, similarly, Nicola 
Clarke26 and Geraldine Hazbun.27 All of them use the notion of “conquest”, instead 
of ‘invasion’.
Considering this stark contrast between Spanish and non-Spanish scholarly 
traditions as a sheer coincidence would be extremely naïve and misleading. 
“Invasion” and “conquest” might be well considered as synonymous terms describing 
the takeover of territories and peoples by a foreign power.28 However, in the case of 
Spanish historical writing, there has been a careful selection of vocabulary in order 
to describe different historical events, and this selection is the result of ideological 
preconceptions and prejudices.
The Mexican scholar Martín Ríos Saloma published in 2011 the most earnest and 
comprehensive attempt thus far to explain the origins of the notion of Reconquista. 
This word remained nearly unknown across the Medieval period to describe the 
21. Chalmeta, Pedro. Invasión e islamización. La conquista de Hispania y la formación de al-Andalus. Madrid: 
Mapfre, 1994.
22. Chalmeta, Pedro. “Historiografía hispana y arabismo: biografía de una distorsión”. Hesperia culturas del 
Mediterráneo, 5 (2006): 195-218.
23. Lacroix de Màrles, Jules. Histoire de la conquête de l’Espagne par les Arabes. Tours: Ad Mame et Cie, 
Imprimeurs-Librairies, 1847.
24. Coppee, Henry. History of the Conquest of Spain by the Arab-Moors. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 
1881.
25. Collins, Roger. The Arab Conquest of Spain (710-797). Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.
26. Clarke, Nicola. The Muslim Conquest of Iberia. Medieval Arabic narratives. Abingdon: Routledge, 2012.
27. Hazbun, Geraldine. Narratives of the Islamic Conquest of Medieval Spain. New York: Palgrave McMillan, 
2015.
28. It holds likewise true that both concepts convey very different meanings in everyday language. For 
example, we speak of “conquest” with a usually positive meaning when talking about “conquering 
someone’s heart”, expressing the positive idea of gaining affection or admiration by means of seduction 
or personal appeal. Likewise, we speak of conquest when a certain group or, in general, the whole society 
gets new rights (“social conquests” or “political conquests”). On the contrary, the idea of “invasion” has 
in everyday speech very negative connotations (‘invading someone’s privacy’), and the same holds true 
in the vocabulary of Biology (“invasive species”) and Medicine (“invasive disease” or “minimally invasive 
surgery”).
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Christian conquest of al-Andalus:29 with this specific meaning, it represents a 
modern neologism that only gained currency over the last quarter of the 19th century, 
remaining excluded from the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy until as late 
as 1936. Considered as the ‘official’ version of the Spanish language, the Dictionary 
does not create new words, but simply acknowledges those commonly used in 
everyday language. For the first time, the already existing entry “Reconquista”, 
which until then conveyed only a generic meaning, was reworded to include a 
new and more specific significance: la recuperación del territorio español invadido por los 
musulmanes y cuyo epílogo fue la toma de Granada en 1492.30
According to this new definition, which may be described as a perfect formulation 
of the traditional Spanish nationalist approach, the medieval Iberian historical 
process could be boiled down to two basic concepts, ‘invasion’ and Reconquista. 
Understanding this difference in vocabulary is key to gaining a correct insight into 
the highly ideological nature of this approach. In sharp contrast with the case of 
the arrival of Islam to Iberia, the Christian takeover of al-Andalus has never been 
called “invasion” in scholarship: the concept of “Christian invasion of al-Andalus” 
is just simply non-existent in scholarly historical writing.31 In fact, even the concept 
of ‘conquest’ has been seldom used to name this historical process.32 A special word 
was created, and if there is a special name it is obviously because the named thing 
is considered unique.
As I mentioned before, this sharp difference of vocabulary must be explained as the 
result of a careful selection at the service of an ideological agenda: while “invasion” 
clearly points to the lack of legitimacy of the Islamic conquest, Reconquista bears 
exactly the opposite meaning. It is not just a simple conquest, but a re-conquest, 
that is to say, the recovery of something previously lost. And you can only lose what 
you have previously owned. This envisioning, therefore, leads rather inevitably to 
the downgrading of Andalusi Muslims as mere interlopers, regardless of the local 
origins of the vast majority of them and also regardless of how long they remained 
living in their territory.33 The Islamic “invasion” and the Reconquista are, therefore, 
29. De Ayala, Carlos. “La Reconquista: ¿ficción o realidad historiográfica?”, La Edad Media peninsular: 
Aproximaciones y problemas, Ángel Gordo, Diego Melo, eds. Gijón: Trea, 2017: 127-142, presents an 
example regarding King Alfonso II of Asturias (791-842), drawing on a 12th-century source.
30. “Recovery of the Spanish territory invaded by the Muslims, which ended with the taking of Granada 
in 1492”. All early versions of the Diccionario are available at Nuevo Tesoro Lexicográfico de la Lengua 
Española: <http://buscon.rae.es/ntlle/SrvltGUILoginNtlle>.
31. The same holds true for “Spanish/Christian invasion of America”: Spanish tradition developed 
instead concepts as “discovery” (descubrimiento) and “evangelization” (evangelización) which tend to hide 
the violent aspects of the process.
32. Of late, the notion of “feudal conquest”, which in all likelihood must be attributed to Barceló, Miquel. 
Arqueología medieval. En las afueras del “medievalismo”. Barcelona: Crítica, 1988: 41, gained traction 
among significant scholarly sectors. Conversely, Manzano, Eduardo. “Al-Andalus: un balance crítico”, 
Villa 4. Histoire et archéologie de l’occident musulman (VIIe-XVe siècle): Al-Andalus, Maghreb, Sicile, Philippe 
Sénac, ed. Toulouse: CNRS-Université de Toulouse-Le Mirail, 2012: 24, brands this notion desafortunada 
(“misguided”).
33. esta visión del musulmán intruso y a la postre vencido ha mantenido una vigencia extraordinaria, no sólo 
entre los historiadores nacionalistas españoles, sino también en otras historiografías peninsulares (“This vision 
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inextricably intertwined, representing the two sides of the same coin, the Spanish 
National Catholic reading of medieval Iberian history.
To sum up, the Reconquista narrative may be sketched in two simple ideas. The 
Muslim takeover of Iberia was illegitimate (invasion) and therefore it provoked 
a legitimate reaction on the side of the Christian ‘Spaniards’. This reaction, the 
Reconquista, luckily lead to the end of the Muslim presence. On the one hand, this 
approach stands for the most powerful myth of the origins of the Spanish nation,34 
which, accordingly, would have been shaped in the fight against Islam.35 On the 
other hand, it represents a highly biased reading of the past aimed at delegitimizing 
the Islamic half of medieval Iberia and at legitimizing the other, Christian half. 
When weaponized for political goals, this approach is not only misleading but also 
extremely toxic and even dangerous, as we shall see below.
3. Spanish Civil War, Francoism and Reconquista
The liberal tradition always held a sincere proud of the artistic and scientific 
achievements of the Iberian Muslims as an integral part of the national heritage, 
and this approach crystallized in the notion of ‘Muslim Spain’, which allowed 
integrating the Islamic period into the national historical narrative. This reading of 
the historical process opposed the most conservative thinking, based on the idea 
of the exclusive Catholic identity of the nation achieved through the Reconquista 
process.36 Liberals and conservatives shared across the 19th century the notion of 
the Reconquista as a national liberation struggle. However, since the 20th century 
of the Muslims as ultimately defeated interlopers has proven highly effective, not only among Spanish 
nationalist historians but also in other Iberian scholarly traditions”) . Manzano, Eduardo. “La construcción 
histórica del pasado nacional”, La gestión de la memoria. La historia de España al servicio del poder, Juan 
Sisinio Pérez Garzón, ed. Barcelona: Crítica, 2000: 55.
34. Spanish and non-Spanish authors alike coincide in considering the mythical nature of the notion 
of Reconquista: “The Islamic presence in Spain has furnished generations of Christian Spaniards with 
a potent national myth”. Fletcher, Richard. Moorish Spain. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1992: 6; 
Ríos Saloma, Martín F. “De la Restauración a la Reconquista: la construcción de un mito nacional (Una 
revisión historiográfica. Siglos XVI-XIX)”. En la España Medieval, 28 (2005): 379-414; uno de los principales 
mitos originarios alumbrados por el nacionalismo español (“one of the main origin myths produced by Spanish 
nationalism”). García Fitz, Francisco. La Reconquista. Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2010: 17; “the 
most successful Spanish national myth”. Hertel, Patricia. The Crescent...: 22; la Reconquista, el mito fundador 
por excelencia de la historia de España (“the Reconquista, the origin myth par excellence of the history of 
Spain”). Furió, Antoni. “Las Españas medievales”, Historia de las Españas. Una aproximación crítica, Joan 
Romero, Antoni Furió, eds. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanc, 2016: 101.
35. Actually, the oldest origins of the nation would be lost in the mists of time, and the Reconquista stands 
as the period in which the national identity got definitely shaped: la más larga y fecunda de las épocas 
doradas, aquélla en la que había cuajado de manera definitiva la identidad nacional (“the longest and most 
fruitful of the golden ages, the one in which the national identity was definitely set”). Álvarez Junco, 
José. Mater dolorosa...: 218.
36. Bravo López, Fernando. “Los nuevos sarracenos”, Al-Andalus y la Historia. 3 May 2019. 20 October 
2019 <http://www.alandalusylahistoria.com/?p=1226>.
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this concept would be increasingly identified with the more conservative sectors, 
reaching its peak during the Franco dictatorship.
1936 not only marks what we might call the definitive lexical consolidation of 
the word Reconquista as the mainstream Spanish name for the Christian conquest of 
al-Andalus. It also represents one of the crucial moments of 20th-century Spanish 
history. The Republican government set up five years before faced on this date a coup 
d’etat by one of his highest military commanders. Having full political and economic 
backing from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, General Franco eventually won the 
ensuing Civil War in 1939, leading the country to a 40 year-long dictatorship.
Right from the beginning of the war, Franco gained full support from the 
highest hierarchy of the Catholic Church, which rushed to dub his coup d’etat as 
a Crusade. Following medieval tradition, Franco was proclaimed after his victory 
caudillo de España por la Gracia de Dios (“chieftain of Spain by God’s grace”) . National 
Catholicism peaked with Francoism, becoming the undeclared official ideology of 
the dictatorship. In this new context, the notion of Reconquista played a decisive and 
unprecedented role as one of Francoism’s most effective ideological weapons.37
Manuel Machado (brother of the outstanding Spanish poet, Antonio Machado) 
once described Franco in a poem as caudillo de la nueva Reconquista.38 According to 
National Catholicism, Franco’s victory over the Republican government represented 
a new liberation of Spain: if the medieval Reconquista set Spain free from the infidel 
Moors, Franco did the same with regard to Marxists, atheists, and Freemasons. 
The media used to regularly and enthusiastically extol Franco’s victory as a new 
Reconquista. In April 1947, on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of that event, 
the newspaper ABC’s front page read as follows: “Without General Franco, Spain, 
besieged by the grip of Marxism, perhaps would never have been the same free 
nation that began to emerge twelve centuries ago in the Reconquista. [The war] 
was, in effect, another Reconquista, based on the force of heroism against a foreign 
enemy”.
The unfolding of the highly charged rhetoric of Reconquista over the early Francoist 
period was not limited to the personal figure of the dictator but also reached 
important State symbols. That’s particularly the case of the eagle of Saint John in 
the new Francoist flag. The eagle had been part of the coat of arms of Ferdinand and 
Isabella, the Catholic Monarchs, who, according to the canonical account, achieved 
national unity by bringing together Castile and Aragon Crowns with their marriage 
and finished the Reconquista process in 1492 with the taking of Granada.
37. Ríos Saloma, Martín. “La reconquista en el primer franquismo: relecturas tras la nueva cruzada”, 
El franquismo y la apropiación del pasado. El uso de la historia, de la arqueología y de la historia del arte para la 
legitimación de la dictadura, Francisco Javier Moreno Martín, ed. Madrid: Fundación Pablo Iglesias, 2017: 
137-158.
38. “Chieftain of the new Reconquista”. Machado, Manuel. Las horas de oro. Madrid: Ediciones Reconquista, 
1938. See Sabaté, Flocel. “Frontera peninsular e identidad (siglos IX-XII)”, Las Cinco Villas aragonesas en 
la Europa de los siglos XII y XIII de la frontera natural a las fronteras políticas y socioeconómicas (foralidad y 
municipalidad), Esteban Sarasa Sánchez, ed. Saragossa: Institución Fernando el Católico, 2007: 57.
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The Civil War represents, by far, the bloodiest carnage in Spanish history, followed 
by a violent crackdown over the vanquished. By using the idea of Reconquista 
to legitimize his coup d’etat, the war against the Republic, and the subsequent 
consolidation of his own personal leadership, Franco was the first one to weaponize 
the concept, turning it into a very effective instrument of fascist terror. In this 
regard, he might well be considered an authentic trailblazer who set the path later 
followed by those with far-right wing tendencies.
A further remark seems in order before moving on. The idea that Francoism 
“appropriated” the notion of Reconquista represents, to my mind, a misleading 
misconception.39 There was no such an “appropriation” and the fact that the 
heyday of National Catholicism matched the peak of the Reconquista rhetoric could 
be considered hardly surprising. Being an integral part of the National Catholic 
narrative since the 19th century, the Reconquista perfectly fit in Franco’s political 
project and Francoism knew perfectly well how to make the most of its potential, 
turning it into a highly effective ideological weapon.
An intense Reconquista rhetoric permeated Francoist Spain at all different levels 
and the education system acted as a particularly effective indoctrinating tool. The 
past represents a suitable instrument to instill nationalist beliefs and patriotic slogans 
and many generations of school children were intensely brainwashed between the 
1940s and the 1970s.40 The following examples, taken from Enciclopedia Álvarez, 
one of the most popular and well-known school textbooks in Spain across the 
1950s and the 1960s, show how easily the Reconquista can be extolled without even 
mentioned by name.
The first case concerns El Cid Campeador, a well-known historical figure whose 
main achievement consisted in the taking of the city of Valencia from the Muslims 
in 1094. While he acted as a soldier of fortune at the service of Muslim and Christian 
rulers alike, he has been credited, however, as a national hero of the Reconquista in 
Spanish traditional narrative, and this is exactly the picture given in the following 
text. Besides the highly biased protrayal of El Cid, the way in which the text 
mentions the arrival of Islam to Iberia is also worth mentioning:
39. Pero lo que determinó su rechazo en nuestros días fue, tal vez, su aplicación a hechos dolorosos del pasado [...]. En 
definitiva, estamos ante una discusión que —aunque viene de lejos— se ha visto marcada por la historia más reciente 
y por el abuso que se hizo del término aplicado a la guerra civil española de 1936-39 ("But what determined 
its rejection in our day was, perhaps its application to painful events of the past [...]. In short, we are 
facing a discussion that —although it comes from afar— has been shaped by the most recent history and 
the undue application of the name to the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39”). González Jiménez, Manuel. 
“¿Re-conquista? Un estado de la cuestión”, Tópicos y realidades de la Edad Media, Eloy Benito Ruano, 
coord. Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2000: I, 156. Emphasis mine: it is worth highlighting the 
euphemistic language underlying the indirect style, apparently trying to dodge the explicit identification 
of Francoism as responsible for el abuso que se hizo del término. 
40. The extent to which Romantic and Nationalist ideas about the Reconquista survive among current 
Spanish undergraduate students is addressed in López, César; Carretero, Mario; Rodríguez-Moneo, 
María. “Conquest or Reconquest? Students’ Conceptions of Nation Embedded in a Historical Narrative”, 
Journal of the Learning Sciences 24/2 (2015): 252-285.
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Hace mucho tiempo entraron en España unas gentes que no eran cristianas. Se llamaban 
árabes y se apoderaron de casi todo nuestro suelo. Los cristianos españoles lucharon 
ochocientos años contra ellos y por fin los echaron de nuestra Patria. Entre los guerreros 
cristianos sobresalió uno que se llamaba el Cid. Este famoso guerrero venció a los árabes en 
muchísimas batallas y les quitó la ciudad de Valencia. El Cid es considerado como modelo de 
caballeros porque era muy bueno y porque todo lo hacía bien.41
The second case concerns King Ferdinand III of Castile and León (1217-1252), 
one of the most prominent Christian rulers in 13th-century Iberia. The text glowingly 
praises and extols Ferdinand as a great warrior and conqueror, considering him as a 
‘model’ for school children:
El mejor rey de todos los que lucharon contra los árabes y los moros fue Fernando III el 
Santo. Fernando III venció a los moros muchas veces y les conquistó las ciudades de Córdoba, 
Jaén, Murcia, Sevilla y Cádiz. Por ser muy bueno ahora está en el Cielo y se llama San 
Fernando. Su fiesta se celebra el 30 de mayo y ha sido elegido Patrono y modelo de los niños 
y jóvenes de España.42
The Francoist period largely coincides with the academic activity of Claudio 
Sánchez-Albornoz (1893-1984) a key scholarly figure in modern Spanish medieval 
studies. While completely away from Francoism, both physically and ideologically, 
he must, however, be considered as the most vocal representative of the Reconquista 
paradigm. Having held high-profile political appointments during the Republican 
period, he pushed back against Franco’s dictatorship, thus becoming part of the 
Spanish exile community in Argentina, where he spent most of his life.
The real significance of Sánchez-Albornoz’s approach can be better reached 
against the background of his well-known polemic with Américo Castro (1885-
1972). Between 1910 and 1936 both scholars shared the same scholarly framework, 
the Centro de Estudios Históricos created in 1910 as a branch of the Junta para Ampliación 
de Estudios e Investigaciones Científicas, founded in 1907 and headed by S. Ramón y 
Cajal (1852-1934) (Spanish Nobel Prize of Medicine in 1906).43 At the same time, 
both were narrowly committed to the Republican government, especially Sánchez-
Albornoz, and therefore they had to flee from Spain upon the outbreak of the Civil 
41. “Long ago, non-Christian peoples entered Spain. They were known as Arabs and they seized nearly all 
of our soil. Spanish Christians fought them for eight hundred years and eventually expelled them from our 
homeland. The most outstanding among the Christian warriors was the one known as El Cid. This famous 
warrior defeated the Arabs in many battles and took from them the city of Valencia. El Cid is considered 
as a model of knights because he was so good and he did all things well”. Álvarez Pérez, Juan Antonio. El 
parvulito. Valladolid: Editorial Miñón, 1965: 38. 
42. “Of all the kings who fought the Arabs and the Moors, Ferdinand III the Saint was the best one. 
He defeated the Moors many times and took from them the cities of Córdoba, Jaén, Murcia, Seville 
and Cádiz. Because he was so good, he is now in heaven and he is called Saint Ferdinand. His day is 
celebrated on May 30th and he has been chosen as patron and model for the Spanish kids”. Álvarez 
Pérez, Juan Antonio. El parvulito...: 40.
43. See the Board’s foundational decree, published in La Gaceta de Madrid, 15 January 1907: <https://boe.
es/datos/pdfs/BOE//1907/015/A00165-00167.pdf>.
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War. Moreover, both also shared the same concern about the historical origins of 
Spanish identity and a similar passionate approach to the past of their country44, 
although their ideas diverged radically in this regard. In a nutshell, while Castro 
tried to challenge the traditional narrative of Spanish history, Sánchez-Albornoz 
represents rather its culmination.45
Considering his strong personal commitment to the Republican government, 
Sánchez-Albornoz might well be described as a clearly progressive personality in his 
time. His approach to the past, however, became increasingly closer to the National 
Catholic narrative, especially after his exile.46 In 1956 he published Spain, a historical 
enigma, his overwhelming and hard-hitting response to Castro. Far from being the 
product of a cultural blending accomplished through the peaceful convivencia of 
Muslims, Christians, and Jews, as Castro claimed in España en su historia: Cristianos, 
moros y judíos, Spanish identity took definite shape in the drawn-out struggle against 
Muslims. On these premises, Sánchez-Albornoz raised the Reconquista to the highest 
possible level, turning it into the key concept of the history of Spain.47 The controversy 
between both scholars sets the stage of the so-called “convivencia wars”48 whose ensuing 
and more recent phase was even harsher and more acrimonious than the first one.
44. In a letter to Arcadio Díaz Quiñones from 1970, Castro confessed: tengo más de afectivo que de científico 
(“I am more emotional than scientific”). Princeton University Archive. Firestone Library. Arcadio Díaz 
Quiñones Papers, Box 3, Folder 14. Sánchez-Albornoz, in turn, was a fiery Catholic believer convinced 
that God appointed him to accomplish his mission as historian: quiero agradecer al Altísimo la empresa por 
mi llevada a cabo. He dicho que Dios puso en mi cuna mi inclinación irrefrenable hacia el estudio y la investigación 
histórica (“I want to thank the Almighty the endeavor I have undertaken. I have said that God put in my 
cradle the unstoppable inclination to historical study and research”). Sánchez-Albornoz, Claudio. España, 
un enigma histórico. Barcelona: Edhasa, 1977: I, iv (“Todavía”, prologue).
45. The scholarship dealing with the controversy between Castro and Sánchez-Albornoz requires an 
updating framed in the most recent developments on medieval Iberian studies: see, for example, Gómez 
Martínez, José Luis. “Américo Castro y Sánchez Albornoz, dos posiciones sobre el origen de los españoles”. 
Nueva Revista de Filología Hispánica, 21/2 (1972): 301-319. According to Patrick Geary: “The entire debate 
about Spanish identity, largely carried on in the 1940s and 1950s, suggested less the vibrancy of national 
history debates in Europe than the backwardness of Spanish history in general”. Geary, Patrick . “Writing 
the Nation: Historians and National Identities from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries”, The 
Middle Ages in the Modern World: Twenty-First Century Perspectives, Bettina Bildhauer, Chris Jones, eds. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2017: 84.
46. Eduardo Manzano describes Sánchez-Albornoz as un ferviente republicano antifranquista cuya obra, 
paradójicamente había marcado la agenda del medievalismo español durante los años de la Dictadura ("a fervent 
anti-Franco Republican whose work, paradoxically, had set the agenda of Spanish medievalism during 
Dictatorship"). Manzano, Eduardo. “Al-Andalus: un balance crítico”...: 19.
47. García-Sanjuán, Alejandro. “Al-Andalus en la historiografía nacionalcatólica española: Claudio 
Sánchez-Albornoz”, eHumanista: Journal of Iberian Studies, 37 (2017): 305-328.
48. Abate, Mark T. “Ever Since Castro: Thomas F. Glick, Medieval Spain, and ‘Convivencia’”, Convivencia 
and Medieval Spain, Mark T. Abate, ed. Cham: Palgrave-McMillan, 2019: 42. A recent and well-balanced 
approach to this old debate in Catlos, Brian. “Christian-Muslim-Jewish Relations, Medieval “Spain”, and 
the Mediterranean: An Historiographical Op-Ed”, In and Of the Mediterranean. Medieval and Early Modern 
Iberian Studies, Michelle Hamilton, Núria Silleras-Fernández, eds. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 
2015: 1-16.
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4. The arrival of democracy and the reformulation of the Reconquista
The demise of Franco in 1975 and the arrival of democracy with the new 
1978 Constitution gave rise to a fresh political context in which, thanks to the 
groundbreaking work of Abilio Barbero (1931-1990) and Marcelo Vigil (1930-1987), 
the notion of Reconquista came under scholarly criticism for the first time in Spain.49 
This critical approach, however, did not succeed and most academic historians across 
the post-Franco era endorsed the Reconquista, either as an “authentic” medieval 
concept,50 or as a useful approach to medieval Iberia, championing a would-be 
‘neutral’ or ideologically unloaded version.51
However, early in the democratic period, Sánchez-Albornoz made clear that such 
an “unloaded” version was merely wishful thinking. Although he remained very 
vocal about the Reconquista across his entire academic path, it was at the end of his 
life when he most staunchly and explicitly featured this notion in the framework of 
the National Catholic ideology:
La Reconquista, nuestra magna empresa medieval, normal reacción contra la traidora invasión islámica 
de España; la maravilla de la Reconquista, ilustrada con increíble heroísmo, no solo forjó nuestro 
talante, nos hizo capaces de realizar nuestras hazañas americanas, conquistando el mundo nuevo para 
España, para la civilización occidental y para Cristo sobre todo. La Reconquista nos llevó a ser la espada 
de Dios sobre la tierra frente a turcos y herejes. La Reconquista es la clave de la historia de España. Lo 
he probado de modo exhaustivo.52
49. Barbero, Abilio; Vigil, Marcelo. La formación del feudalismo en la Península Ibérica. Barcelona: Crítica, 
1978.
50. Lomax, Dereck William. The Reconquest of Spain. London: Longman, 1978: 1, considered the 
Reconquista “a conceptual framework useful to historians, but no an artificial one like the Middle Ages”. 
However, he acknowledged that it was “an ideal invented by Spanish Christians son after 711”. Lomax 
does not clarify how something can be, at the same time, “not artificial” and “invented”.
51. el término reconquista no puede ser utilizado para definir el ser de España, en el supuesto de que ese ser pueda 
ser definido, pero en cambio sí puede ser utilizado, porque resulta muy significativo y preciso para ello, para definir 
una vieja idea o concepción política que sí es medieval, la que durante siglos legitimó la expansión de los reinos 
cristianos peninsulares y justificó una extraordinaria concentración de poder en manos de sus monarcas ("the term 
Reconquista cannot be used to Spanish "being", even on the assumption that this being can be defined. 
However, it can be used, because it is very significant and precise for it, to define an old political idea 
or conception which across the medieval period legitimized the expansion of the peninsular Christian 
kingdoms and justified an extraordinary concentration of power in the hands of their monarchs"). 
De Ayala, Carlos. “Realidad y percepción de Hispania en la Edad Media”. eHumanista: Journal of Iberian 
Studies, 37 (2017): 208.
52. "The Reconquista, our great medieval feat, normal reaction against the treacherous Islamic invasion of 
Spain; the marvel of the Reconquista, illustrated with incredible heroism, not only shaped our spirit, but 
made us capable of accomplishing our feats in America: we seized the new world for Spain, for Western 
civilization, and above all for Christ. The Reconquista turned us into the sword of God on earth against 
Turks and heretics. The Reconquista is the key to the history of Spain. I have proven it compellingly". 
Sánchez-Albornoz, Claudio. De la Andalucía islámica a la de hoy. Madrid: Rialp, 1983: 32-33. The National 
Catholic idea of Reconquista has likewise reached some non-Spanish authors: Cook, David. Understanding 
Jihad. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005: 51, claims that it had “something of the character 
of a liberation movement”.
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De la Andalucía islámica a la de hoy (“From Islamic Andalusia to Today’s”) represents 
the outraged and bitterly acrimonious reaction of a 90 year-old historian to the 
post-Franco surge of a local Andalusian nationalist movement which considered al-
Andalus the heyday of the “Andalusian nation”.53 The highly biased and ideologically 
heavy burden of his approach notwithstanding, Sánchez-Albornoz got a very warm 
reception in significant sectors of Spanish Medieval Studies, as we shall see next.54
Sánchez-Albornoz firmly rejected Francoism and remained faithful to his political 
ideas, serving as president of the Spanish Republican Government in Exile between 
1962 and 1970. His steadfast political commitment granted him a well-deserved 
reputation. In 1984, a few weeks before his passing, the newly democratic Spain 
publicly acknowledged him with the Prince of Asturias Prize, closely associated with 
the Spanish Crown and considered as the highest honorific distinction granted in 
the country.55
Unlike Castro, largely ignored and even dismissed in Spanish scholarship, 
Sánchez-Albornoz has been highly regarded as historian.56 On the occasion of 
the aforementioned Prize, Miguel Ángel Ladero (medievalist and member of the 
Spanish Academy of History) paid him a glowing tribute in the newspaper El País. 
He praised Sánchez-Albornoz, branding him the best Spanish historian of the 20th 
century and claiming that “the medievalists of these lands will always be vassals 
53. Probably the best representative of Andalusian nationalist scholarship is Acosta Sánchez, José 
Antonio. Historia y cultura del pueblo andaluz. Barcelona: Anagrama, 1979. This tendency, however, did 
not crystallize in a consolidated scholarly tradition, neither Andalusian nationalism has ever been a 
strong political movement. 
54. Despojada de las retóricas e inevitables adherencias de una historiografía de corte romántico-tradicionalista, [la 
Reconquista] ha sido reforzada por las investigaciones de los más reputados historiadores de este siglo. El primero de 
ellos, sin duda, don Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, maestro del moderno medievalismo ("Once stripped away from 
the romantic rhetoric typical of the most traditional scholarship, [the Reconquista] has been reinforced 
by the investigations of the most renowned historians of this century. The first of them, without a 
doubt, was Don Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, master of the modern medievalism"). González Jiménez, 
Manuel. “¿Re-conquista?... ”, 163. This text includes two striking claims. First, the idea of Reconquista 
as an “unloaded” concept. Secondly, the effort to dissociate Sánchez-Albornoz from the “romantic and 
traditionalist scholarship”. In fact, the truth is exactly the opposite: Sánchez-Albornoz accounts for the 
most outstanding representative of that approach.
55. “El historiador Claudio Sánchez Albornoz obtiene el Premio Príncipe de Asturias de Comunicación y 
Humanidades”. El País, 26 May 1984. See the official statement of the Príncipe de Asturias Foundation’s 
Jury (Acta del Jurado): <http://www.fpa.es/es/premios-princesa-de-asturias/premiados/1984-claudio-
sanchez-albornoz.html?texto=acta&especifica=0>.
56. Pérez-Prendes, José Manuel. “Semblanza y obra de don Claudio Sánchez Albornoz”. En la España 
Medieval, 8 (1986): 19-52; Martín, José Luis. “Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz en la historiografía sobre 
la Edad Media hispana”. Cuadernos de Estudios Gallegos, 42/107 (1995): 171-205; Maíz Chacón, Jordi. 
“Claudio Sánchez Albornoz y los mitos medievales de la historia de España”. Nonnullus. Revista de Historia, 
Supplement II (2009): 34-40. Outside Spain, however, his nationalist approach came under sharp 
criticism: Russel, Peter Edward. “The Nessus-Shirt of Spanish History”. Bulletin of Hispanic Studies, 36/4 
(1959): 219-225. See also a rather critical review by Hillgarth, Jocelyn Nigel. “Spain, a Historical Enigma 
by Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz, Colette Joly Dees, David Sven Reher”. The American Historical Review, 83/2 
(April 1978): 455-456, who, among other things, claims that “to see the Reconquest as ‘the key to the 
history of Spain’ inevitably leads to the depreciation of the peoples ‘reconquered’”. Foreign criticism on 
Sánchez-Albornoz has been rather ignored in Spain.
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of his example and will be in debt of his work”. Ladero likewise made a rather 
bombastic extolling of Spain, a historical enigma in terms of “the broadest and most 
comprehensive reflection ever written about our History from a medieval and 
Castilian point of view” and “a milestone and unavoidable point of reference for 
those who want to know more and better about Spain”.57 It is no wonder that 
Ladero embraced Sánchez-Albornoz’s idea of the Reconquista as the keystone of 
Spanish Middle Ages.58
On the other hand, Ladero played a crucial role in the field of medieval studies in 
Spain in recent years, linking together traditional and modern conservative Spanish 
scholarship. In addition to espousing and preserving Sánchez-Albornoz’s legacy, he 
sponsored the most earnest attempt to refashion the Reconquista paradigm in the 
post-Franco era. In his prologue to Al-Andalus contra España. La forja del mito, Ladero 
highly praised the work done by Serafín Fanjul, explicitly endorsing his approach 
as largely compatible with his own ideas.59 Before focusing on Fanjul’s role as the 
most consistent scholarly reformer of the Reconquista paradigm, a quick look at the 
political and ideological context in which his work was developed seems in order.
4.1. The influence of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ doctrine
In the mid-1990s, a new political and ideological context framed the reformulation 
of the Reconquista. At the local Spanish level, José María Aznar, leader of PP 
(mainstream Spanish conservative political party) won the elections in 1996, putting 
an end to 14 years of leftist government lead by Felipe González and the Labor Party. 
57. Ladero Quesada, Miguel Ángel. “Don Claudio, la Edad Media y nosotros”, El País, 3 June 1984. 
Besides, he devoted more extensive publications to Sánchez-Albornoz: Ladero Quesada, Miguel Ángel. 
“Presentación”, En la España Medieval, 8 (1986): 13-18; Ladero Quesada, Miguel Ángel. “¿Es todavía 
España un enigma histórico? (releyendo a Sánchez-Albornoz)”, Lecturas sobre la España histórica. Madrid: 
Real Academia de la Historia, 1998: 317-341.
58. Ladero Quesada, Miguel Ángel. “La ‘Reconquête’, clef de voûte du Moyen Âge espagnol”, L’expansion 
occidentale (XIe - XVe siècles) Formes et conséquences XXXIIIe Congrès de la S.H.M.E.S. Paris: Éditions de la 
Sorbonne, 2003: 23-45. And so does, apparently, Manuel González Jiménez: En su obra 'España, un 
enigma histórico', defendió, con la contundencia que le caracterizaba, la tesis de que la reconquista fue, nada más y 
nada menos, que “la clave de la historia de España”, negando de paso lo afirmado por Ortega y Gasset, Altamira, 
Américo Castro y otros ("With this typical hard-hitting style, in his España, un enigma histórico, he claimed 
that the Reconquista was nothing short than 'the key to the history of Spain', thus calling into question 
what had previously been argued by Ortega y Gasset, Altamira, Américo Castro, and others"). González 
Jiménez, Manuel. “¿Re-conquista?... ”: 163-164.
59. encuentro en el fondo argumental del libro y en su desarrollo muchísimos elementos concordantes con las 
reflexiones y puntos de vista que he ido elaborando desde hace un tercio de siglo en investigaciones sobre épocas y temas 
distintos de los que Serafín Fanjul trata en su obra, de modo que mi experiencia converge con la suya, o viceversa, pero 
apenas se han influido la una a la otra en sus procesos de maduración ("Both in the core arguments of the book 
and in its development I find very many elements consistent with reflections and points of view that I 
have developed over the last 30 years when studying periods and issues different than those approached 
by Serafín Fanjul, in such a way that my experience converges on his, or vice versa, but without any 
mutual influence between us"). Ladero Quesada, Miguel Ángel. “Prólogo”, Al-Andalus contra España. La 
forja del mito, Serafín Fanjul. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2000: xi.
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About the same time, the American political scientist Samuel Huntington (1927-
2008) formulated the so-called doctrine of the “Clash of Civilizations”, providing a 
new ideological framework in which the Reconquista could thrive. In this approach, 
Islam is regarded as the last challenge to the hegemony of liberalism and Western 
Civilization worldwide.60 The war against terrorism after the September 11th attacks 
confirmed the antagonistic role attributed to Islam in the new international order.
Years before taking office as head of Government, Aznar offered a remarkably 
significant hint about his vision of the medieval past of his country and the role 
played by the Reconquista. In the late 1980s, the newspaper El País asked different 
figures from Spanish politics and culture to dress up as their favorite historical 
characters. Aznar, by then President of the Autonomous Community of Castile-
León, chose to get disguised as El Cid Campeador, one of the false heroes of the 
traditional Reconquista rhetoric, as I have shown above.61
Aznar must be considered a genuine trailblazer as he first paved the way for 
the highly-loaded Reconquista rhetoric recently adopted by far-right sectors, as we 
shall see below. On March 11, 2004, the worst terrorist attacks ever on Spanish soil 
took place. In this dramatic context, the historical relationship of Spain with Islam 
was back in the public conversation, revealing the abidingly problematic role of al-
Andalus within Spanish historical memory. 
In September of the same year, when the country was still reeling from the shock 
of the attacks, Aznar gave a public lecture at Georgetown University in which he 
formulated his peculiar explanation of what happened in Madrid a few months 
before. In his view, the terrorist attacks bore no connection whatsoever with the 
2003 invasion of Iraq, in which his Government participated, thereby ignoring the 
overwhelming opposition of the Spanish public. To his mind, the real causes of the 
dreadful train bombings had to be found elsewhere, deep within history:
The problem Spain has with Al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism did not begin with the 
Iraq Crisis. In fact, it has nothing to do with government decisions. You must go 
back no less than 1.300 years, to the early eighth century, when a Spain recently 
invaded by the Moors refused to become just another piece in the Islamic world 
and began a long battle to recover its identity. This Reconquista process was very 
long, lasting some 800 years. However, it ended successfully.62
60. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996.
61. “La mejor foto de Aznar no es la de las Azores: recuperamos su sesión como Cid Campeador”, El País. 
Verne, 7 April 2017: <https://verne.elpais.com/verne/2017/04/07/articulo/1491558464_811336.html>.
62. The text of Aznar’s lecture (titled “Seven Thesis on Today’s Terrorism”) is not included in his personal 
Website: https://jmaznar.es/es. See the clip of the exact moment of his medievalism at: <https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=e7no1WObcRs>. An integral Spanish version of the original English lecture in 
El Siglo: <http://www.elsiglodeuropa.es/siglo/historico/politica/politica2004/618Aznar.htm>. Aznar’s 
lecture made headlines in the main Spanish mass media: “Aznar asegura en Washington que el 
problema de España con Al Qaeda ‘empieza en el siglo VIII’”. El Mundo, 22 September 2004: <https://
www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2004/09/22/espana/1095805990.html>. Aznar was heavily criticized for his 
“delusional approach” and his “one-sided and rudimentary talk” by Elorza, Antonio. “La espada de Tariq”, 
El País, 25 September 2004: <https://elpais.com/diario/2004/09/25/espana/1096063211_850215.html>. 
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Unlike the National Catholic tradition, Aznar’s political repurposing of the 
Reconquista was not primarily aimed at exalting Spanish national identity: rather, he 
used this notion to explain the jihadist terrorist attacks. By so doing, he was bringing 
the Reconquista to its new ideological framework: as British historian Andrew Elliott 
points out, “the clash of civilisations theory is seen to be operating under the surface 
of much of the medievalist discourse surrounding the War on Terror”.63
Only two years later, Aznar confirmed that his words at Georgetown were 
neither a merely unwitting mistake nor the result of a reckless incursion in the field 
of history, but an intended medievalism that encapsulated his personal approach to 
the past of his country. In 2006, Pope Ratzinger came under sharp criticism from 
across the globe after drawing a contrast between Islam as the religion of jihad 
and Catholicism as the religion of logos.64 When many voices (especially in the 
Islamic world) were asking him to apologize, Aznar leaped to his defense arguing 
that, rather than the Pope, Muslims should apologize “for having conquered Spain 
and remained there for eight centuries”.65 However baffling, far-fetched, and even 
outlandish and delusional this claim may look, Aznar is certainly not an exception: 
as we shall see below, similar demands of apologies have been raised recently by 
different actors with regard to other historical events. On the other hand, Aznar 
clearly aimed at the illegitimacy of the Muslim presence in Iberia, one of the core 
tenets of the traditional Reconquista paradigm, and it is thus hardly surprising that he 
shares the notion that somos una nación constituida frente al islam.66
Beyond the criticism he drew in the media,67 Aznar’s statement provoked a 
rather snide reaction on the part of the Muslim community. Mansur Escudero 
(1947-2010), the then president of the Spanish Islamic Board (Junta Islámica), 
disparaged him by saying he was just talking rubbish (memeces). Furthermore, as 
a psychiatrist, Escudero asserted that Aznar “must probably be affected by early 
senile dementia, as he seems to have lost the sense of reality”.68 However, over the 
last years, Muslims have furthered similar claims to Spanish authorities. In 2002, 
Moroccan hispanist Muḥammad ibn ‛Azzūz Ḥakīm (1924-2014) sent a letter to King 
Juan Carlos I (r. 1975-2014) asking that the privileged access to Spanish citizenship 
Conversely, he got the nod from Fanjul, Serafín. “El paraíso que nunca existió”. Libertad Digital, 12 July 
2005: <https://www.libertaddigital.com/opinion/serafin-fanjul/el-paraiso-que-nunca-existio-28555/>, 
claiming that the idea that ‘our’ problems with Islam started back in 711 is irrefutable.
63. Elliott, Andrew R. B. Medievalism...: 93.
64. See the full text of the Pope’s lecture at the Vatican’s Website: <https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg.html>.
65. Monge, Yolanda. “Aznar pretende que los musulmanes le pidan perdón por haber ‘conquistado 
España y ocuparla por ocho siglos’”. El País, 23 September 2006: <https://elpais.com/diario/2006/09/23/
espana/1158962427_850215.html>.
66. “we are a nation shaped against Islam”. Aznar, José María. Cartas a un joven español. Barcelona: 
Planeta, 2007: 162.
67. See, for example, Goytisolo, Juan. “¡Felicitaciones, señor Aznar!”. El País, 27 September 2006: 
<https://elpais.com/diario/2006/09/27/opinion/1159308005_850215.html>.
68. “La Junta Islámica descalifica las palabras de Aznar contra la conquista musulmana de España”. El 
País, 24 September 2006: <https://elpais.com/diario/2006/09/24/espana/1159048815_850215.html>.
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granted to the Sephardic Jews be equally provided to the descendants of Muslims 
from al-Andalus.69 More recently, the Islamic community of Seville urged King 
Felipe VI (r. 2014-) to apologize for the “atrocities” committed after the taking of 
Granada in 1492.70 
Regardless of the accuracy or pertinence of these claims, it seems rather obvious 
that a double standard has been played out with regard to Sephardic Jews and the 
descendants of Moriscos. While neither a single official nor symbolic action has been 
taken in Spain with the descendants of the Muslims, the Sephardic Jews, however, 
received several gestures of reparation since 1990, when they were awarded with 
the Prince of Asturias prize of Concord as a “beloved part of the Hispanic family”.71 
More recently (2015) the Spanish Government passed a law that fast-tracks their 
access to Spanish citizenship.72 In sharp contrast, the initiative for awarding the 
descendants of the Muslims the Prince of Asturias Prize on the occasion of the 
anniversary of the Moriscos’ expulsion (1609) was turned down in 2010.73
4.2. Fanjul and the ‘Myth of al-Andalus’ approach
Aznar’s political repurposing of the Reconquista ran parallel to the scholarly work 
carried out by Fanjul in Al-Andalus contra España (2000), followed a few years later 
by La quimera de al-Andalus (2004). A correct understanding of Fanjul’s role requires 
a quick overview of the scholarly evolution in Spain after the arrival of democracy 
in 1978. According to traditional conservative approach, Spanish national identity 
definitely consolidated through an eight centuries-long liberation struggle against 
69. Arias, Jesús. “Los descendientes de andalusíes dicen que la Ley de Extranjería los margina”. El País, 
21 December 2002: <https://elpais.com/diario/2002/12/21/andalucia/1040426557_850215.html>.
70. Rodríguez, Chema. “La Comunidad Islámica de Sevilla reclama a Felipe VI que pida perdón por las 
‘atrocidades’ de la conquista de Granada”. El Mundo, 29 March 2019: <https://www.elmundo.es/andalu
cia/2019/03/29/5c9e5741fdddff69728b467e.html>.
71. See the Website of Fundación Princesa de Asturias: <http://www.fpa.es/es/premios-princesa-de-
asturias/premiados/1990-comunidades-sefardies.html?especifica=0>. The monarchist Spanish press 
praised this decision in glowing terms: Fernández, Vicente. “El Príncipe de Asturias reconcilia a España 
con los Sefardíes”. ABC, 19 October 1990.
72. “Spain passes law awarding citizenship to descendants of expelled Jews”. The Guardian, 11 June 2015: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/11/spain-law-citizenship-jews>. According to Spanish 
authorities, 132,226 people of Sephardic descent applied for Spanish citizenship before the deadline 
(October 1, 2019): see Jones, Sam. “132,000 descendants of expelled Jews apply for Spanish citizenship”. 
The Guardian, 2 October 2019: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/02/132000-sephardic-jews-
apply-for-spanish-citizenship. In spite of the aforementioned gestures in favor of the Sephardic Jews, the 
president of the Conference of European Rabbis, Pinchas Goldschmidt, claimed that Spain should apologize 
for what happened in 1492: “Chief rabbi calls on Spain to apologize for expulsion of Jews”, El País, 17 
February 2014: <https://elpais.com/elpais/2014/02/17/inenglish/1392634704_748454.html>.
73. Caravaca, Toñi. “Quieren el premio Príncipe de Asturias para los moriscos a los cinco siglos 
de su expulsion”, El Mundo, 8 April 2010: <https://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/08/
andalucia/1270756235.html>. On the Arab memory about the Moriscos, see Matar, Nabil. “The 
Expulsion of the Andalusi in Arab Memory, 1609/1614-2014”, The Study of al-Andalus. The Scholarship and 
Legacy of James T. Monroe, Michelle Hamilton, David Wacks, eds. Boston: Ilex Foundation, 2018: 229-244.
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Muslims. This narrative was part of the National Catholic reading of the history 
of Spain which achieved full hegemony over the Francoist period. For obvious 
reasons, National Catholicism fell into deep disrepute after Franco’s dead in 1975. 
The new political and ideological context required a fresh reengineering of the old 
and musty approach, narrowly identified with Francoism. The Reconquista needed 
help desperately, but the ‘rescue operation’ was not an easy task. It had to be taken 
out of the dark cave of National Catholicism and put it in a safe place, that is to say, 
in a new framework in which it could survive. Likewise, it was crucial to preserve 
the ideological burden associated with the concept because otherwise, it would 
be as useless as an unloaded weapon. Uprooting the Reconquista from the dry and 
unproductive soil of National Catholicism and transplanting it to the much more 
fertile ground of the Clash of Civilizations was the delicate assignment carried out 
by Fanjul. Put differently, he successfully poured old wine into a new bottle, so to 
speak. If he were a film-maker, the title of his movie would be ‘Reconquista reloaded’.
In his first book, Fanjul solemnly (and falsely) claimed the end of conservative 
Spanish nationalist mythology.74 Actually, the notion of Reconquista is hardly 
mentioned in his book and he focused on something apparently very different 
called the ‘myth of al-Andalus’. In his view, Castro and his followers should be 
held accountable for engaging in the formulation of an extremely distorting 
approach to medieval Iberia. Far from being a paradise of religious tolerance or 
convivencia, al-Andalus represented a much darker and harsher historical reality: 
the living conditions of non-Muslims, based on the legal status of dhimma, were 
marked by the sign of submission and humiliation. So much so that their situation 
would be similar to apartheid.75 In other words, Fanjul’s emphasis was no longer the 
highly simplistic extolling of the Reconquista as an eight-centuries long struggle for 
the liberation of the nation but rather —and very much in line with the Clash of 
Civilizations doctrine— the excoriating of Islam as the antithesis of the supposedly 
Western values of freedom and democracy.
While Fanjul claims to play a myth-shattering role, he rather ignores the most 
influential and widespread myth, the Reconquista. Although seemingly aimed at 
debunking the myth of tolerance, there is a second, underlying, message in his 
approach: how lucky are ‘we’ (Spaniards) for having gotten rid of such an intolerant 
people, an idea that perfectly coincides with the old Reconquista paradigm. Actually, 
74. Fanjul, Serafín. Al-Andalus contra España...: 98. 
75. Fanjul, Serafín. “¿Eran españoles los moriscos? El mito de al-Andalus”, España, un hecho. Madrid: 
FAES, 2003: 281; Fanjul, Serafín. La quimera de al-Andalus, José María Lasalle, coord. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 
2004: 28-29.
Imago TemporIs. medIum aevum, XIV (2020): 133-162 / ISSN 1888-3931 / DOI 10.21001/itma.2020.14.04
AlejAndro GArcíA-SAnjuán152
this idea is not merely a veiled insinuation: Fanjul seems to endorse the expulsion 
of moriscos in 160976 and constantly rails against multiculturalism in the media.77
On the other hand, Fanjul ignores the stark difference between the theoretical 
dhimma legal rules and their real application, an important distinction when it comes 
to describing the situation of religious minorities in classical Islamic societies78. But 
perhaps the most serious trouble raised by Fanjul is that, although he is trying to 
debunk the myth of tolerance and idealized convivencia, his alternative of al-Andalus 
as a ‘chilling’ period does not seem much more realistic,79 and the same could be 
applied to the parallel he draws between the dhimma and the notion of apartheid, 
which is mistaken in addition to being anachronistic.
Although apparently disengaged from the traditional notion of Reconquista and 
focused on debunking the myth of tolerance, Fanjul remains, in fact, very close 
to old ideas about the role of al-Andalus in the national narrative. The title of his 
first book (Al-Andalus against Spain) clearly points to the idea of al-Andalus as the 
“anti-Spain”, one of the key elements of the Reconquista paradigm. Accordingly, and 
following the prevailing 19th-century Spanish scholarly tradition, Fanjul describes 
the origins of al-Andalus in terms of an appalling catastrophe, claiming that the 
Islamic conquest caused a conmoción (...) brutal (“brutal shock”) and provoked un 
cataclismo político  y social (“a political and social cataclysm”).80
Both the idea of al-Andalus as a paradise of religious tolerance and the Reconquista 
must be fairly considered myths, but there are clear differences worth mentioning. 
Far from being a consolidated and widespread scholarly approach, as Fanjul claims, 
the myth of al-Andalus has been for the most part promoted by non-specialized 
authors and among non-scholarly audiences.81 By contrast, the Reconquista not only 
76. According to Fanjul, Serafín. “Inmigrantes y moriscos”. ABC, 4 January 2007, the moriscos hated 
Spaniards to death (una nación a la que sus antepasados expulsados odiaban a muerte, antes y después de su exilio), 
although, at the same time, he fully understands that attitude (los moriscos tenían motivaciones objetivas y 
directas para odiar a España y los españoles). In this regard, it seems worth recalling a legal Islamic text from 
late 15th century in which some exiled Andalusi Muslims are blamed for apparently like better returning 
to Iberia under Christian rule rather than remaining in North Africa under Islamic rule: see Maíllo 
Salgado, Felipe. “Del Islam residual mudéjar”, España, Al-Andalus, Sefarad: síntesis y nuevas perspectivas, 
Felipe Maíllo Salgado, ed. Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1990: 135.
77. Palmero, Fernando. “Serafín Fanjul: ‘No existe el deseo de integración entre los musulmanes’”. El 
Mundo, 2 September 2017: <https://www.elmundo.es/opinion/2017/09/02/59a9a691e5fdea86788b45
ab.html>.
78. Lewis, Bernard. The Political Language of Islam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 66.
79. Vaquero, Natalia. “Fanjul: La época de al-Andalus fue terrorífica”, La opinión de Málaga, 27 July 2015: 
<https://www.laopiniondemalaga.es/sociedad/2015/07/27/epoca-andalus-terrorifica/784091.html>.
80. Fanjul, Serafín. Al-Andalus contra España...: 24. On this regard, see García Sanjuán, Alejandro. “El 
origen de al-Andalus en el discurso españolista: catastrofismo y negacionismo en torno a la conquista 
musulmana de la península ibérica”, El islam: pasado de un futuro. XXVIII Semana de Estudios Medievales 
(Nájera, 24-28 Julio 2017). Logroño: Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2018: 37-65.
81. A well-known exception is the book by Menocal, María Rosa. The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, 
Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
2002. On the other hand, in his 2009 remarks to the Muslim world in Cairo, President Obama likely 
pronounced the most recent and well-known political expression of the myth of tolerance: “Islam has a 
proud tradition of tolerance. We see it in the history of Andalusia and Cordoba during the Inquisition”. 
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stands for a highly consolidated academic concept, but actually represents one of 
the most solid pillars of Spanish scholarship. At the same time, the myth of the 
Reconquista holds a highly toxic and even dangerous ideological potential. Certainly, 
the myth of al-Andalus has been intensely promoted by jihadist organizations, but 
I am not aware of any scholar, let alone policy-makers, supporting the recovery of 
al-Andalus by Al Qaeda or ISIS. Conversely, the myth of the Reconquista remains 
currently widely accepted in Spain, spreading across academic, politic and media 
outlets. Both myths, therefore, are neatly different, not only in their scholarly 
reach, but also in their respective social and political consideration.
Right after Aznar’s statements and the publication of Fanjul’s books, Eduardo 
Manzano incisively warned of ‘an unspeakable conservative reaction’ pointing out 
to an “enraged return” of a highly ideological version of the Reconquista ‘that seemed 
definitely cornered’ promoted by “historians, publicists, and bitter politicians”.82 It 
would have been hardly possible, however, to foresee the breadth and scale reached 
by the current political and ideological reengineering of the Reconquista.
5. Reconquista and current far-right tendencies
Although he received notably poor reviews from different Spanish specialists,83 
Fanjul quickly became a largely influential author, both in the most conservative 
academic outlets and in the media.84 Elected in 2011 as a member of Real Academia de 
la Historia, the impregnable stronghold of traditional Spanish scholarship, his books 
from 2000 and 2004 have recently appeared together in French translation.85 The 
book by D. Fernández-Morera, intended “to demystify Islamic Spain by questioning 
See the full text in “Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo”: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/
politics/04obama.text.html.
82. Manzano, Eduardo. Conquistadores, Emires y Califas. Los Omeya y la formación de al-Andalus. Barcelona: 
Crítica, 2006: 21-22.
83. Manzano, Eduardo. “Fanjul, Serafín: Al-Andalus contr España. La forja de un mito, Madrid, 2000, 
249 págs., ISBN: 84-323-1042-5”. Hispania, 61/209 (2001): 1161-1164; Martínez Núñez, María Antonia. 
“El mito de al-Andalus”. Revista de Libros, 81 (September 2003): <https://www.revistadelibros.com/
articulos/el-mito-de-al-andalus>; Rodríguez Mediano, Fernando. “Fanjul, Serafín. ‘La quimera de al-
Andalus’, Madrid (Siglo Veintiuno de España Editores), 2004, 271 págs”. Aljamía: Anuario de Información 
Bibliográfica, 18 (2006): 295-300. Particularly intense was the controversy with Maribel Fierro: Fierro, 
Maribel. “Idealización de al-Andalus”. Revista de Libros, 94 (October, 2004): <https://www.revistadelibros.
com/articulo_imprimible.php?art=3978&t=articulos>; Fanjul, Serafín. “El paraíso perdido”. Revista de 
Libros 96 (December 2004): <https://www.revistadelibros.com/articulos/el-paraiso-perdido>; Fierro, 
Maribel. “¿De quién es el Paraíso?”. Revista de Libros, 98 (February 2005): <https://www.revistadelibros.
com/articulo_imprimible.php?art=4618&t=articulos>.
84. See, for instance, Palmero, Fernando. “El mito de al-Andalus”, El Mundo, 24 August 2017: <https://
www.elmundo.es/opinion/2017/08/24/599db272ca4741e7198b45ea.html>.
85. Fanjul, Serafín. Al Andalous, l’invention d’un mythe. La réalité historique de l’Espagne des trois cultures. 
Paris: L’Artilleur, 2017. See the review by García-Sanjuán, Alejandro. “Serafín Fanjul. – ‘Al Andalous, 
l’invention d’un mythe. La réalité historique de l’Espagne des trois cultures’. Paris, L’Artilleur, 2017, 732 
pp.”. Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale, 61/3 (2018): 299-301.
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the widespread belief that it was a wonderful place of tolerance and convivencia of 
three cultures under the benevolent supervision of enlightened Muslim rulers”,86 
most likely represents the best instance of Fanjul’s influence outside Spain. In turn, 
Spanish87 and French versions88 of this book have recently been published.
R. Sánchez Saus, the author of Al-Andalus y la cruz. La invasion musulmana de 
Hispania (a book written with the single goal of downgrading al-Andalus as a 
mere prequel of ISIS), stands as the most talented Spanish imitator of Fanjul.89 
Having no previous expertise whatsoever in the field of al-Andalus, his book must 
be understood as a purely ideological byproduct. Actually, Sánchez Saus perfectly 
illustrates the narrow connection between the “myth of al-Andalus” approach and 
far-right ideology, as revealed by his very colorful political track record. Years ago, 
he served as senior member of Falange Española,90 a well-known fascist Spanish 
political party, and in 2015 he ran as Vox’s candidate to the local Andalusian 
elections.91
Given his far-right ideological profile, it is no surprise that he praised Franco’s 
dictatorship in terms of aquellas décadas que cambiaron la suerte de España a base de 
86. Fernández-Morera, Darío. The Myth of the Andalusian Paradise: Muslims, Christians, and Jews Under Muslim 
Rule. Wilmington: ISI Books, 2016: 2. It has been very poorly reviewed by Fierro, Maribel. “Fernández-
Morera, Darío. ‘The Myth of the Andalusian Paradise: Muslims, Christians, and Jews under Islamic Rule 
in Medieval Spain’, Wilmington (Delaware), Intercollegiate Studies Institute Books, 2016, 363 págs.”. 
Al-Qantara, 39/1 (2018): 248-253, and Pearce, Sarah J. “Paradise Lost”. 17 March 2017 <https://wp.nyu.
edu/sjpearce/2017/03/17/paradise-lost/>. A much more benign consideration by Dadson, Trevor. “‘The 
Myth of the Andalusian Paradise: Muslims, Christians, and Jews under Islamic Rule in Medieval Spain’ 
by Darío Fernández-Morera”. Modern Language Review, 113/2 (2018): 421-423.
87. Fernández-Morera, Darío. El mito del paraíso andalusí: musulmanes, cristianos y judíos bajo el dominio 
islámico en la España medieval. Cordoba: Almuzara, 2018.
88. Fernández-Morera, Darío. Chrétiens, juifs et musulmans dans al-Andalus. Mythes et réalités de l’Espagne 
islamique. Paris: JC Godefroy, 2018.
89. See the review by Fierro, Maribel. “Al-Andalus, convivencia e islam: mucho ruido y pocas nueces”. 
Revista de Libros, 17 October 2018: <https://www.revistadelibros.com/discusion/al-andalus-convivencia-
e-islam-mucho-ruido-y-pocas-nueces>. Despite its rather appalling academic quality, the book has 
been published also in French: Sánchez Saus, Rafael. Les chrétiens dans al-Andalus. De la soumission 
à l’anéantissement. Paris: Editions du Rocher, 2019. Significantly, the French versions of the books by 
Fanjul, Sánchez Saus, and Fernández-Morera were published thanks to the efforts of A. Imatz, an 
obscure Basque-French admirer of José-Antonio Primo de Rivera (founder of Falange Española): to get a 
grasp of his rather depressing concept of historical knowledge, see Imatz, Arnaud. “Los falsificadores de la 
historia y el mito del Al-Ándalus”, La Tribuna del País Vasco, 4 June 2019: <https://latribunadelpaisvasco.
com/art/11087/los-falsificadores-de-la-historia-y-el-mito-del-al-andalus>.
90. Rodríguez Jiménez, J. L. La extrema derecha en España: del Tardofranquismo a la consolidación de la 
Democracia (1967-1982). PhD Complutense University of Madrid, 1992: 26. Available at: <https://eprints.
ucm.es/2360/>.
91. Maestre, Rita. “Rafael Sánchez Saus y otros dos catedráticos, en las listas de Vox por Sevilla”. ABC, 12 
February 2015: <https://sevilla.abc.es/elecciones/andalucia/20150212/sevi-listas-sevilla-201502121217.
html>. See Sánchez Saus, Rafael. Por qué Vox. El despertar de la derecha social en España. Madrid: Homo 
Legens, 2019. Actually, Sánchez Saus is not the only Spanish scholar committed to the far-right: in the 
April 2019 general elections, the Arabist J. Ramírez del Río (University of Córdoba) got one of the 22 
seats of Vox in the National Parliament.
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ofrecer pan y dignidad a los españoles.92 Similarly, Sánchez Saus described Franco as the 
true architect of Spanish democracy: Un jefe de Estado reconocido internacionalmente 
de forma unánime durante 35 años, de cuya acción de gobierno en esas décadas dimana la 
España nueva que hizo posible la Monarquía parlamentaria, el régimen democrático y la 
Constitución.93 Being staunchly Francoist in his leanings, it is hardly surprising to 
learn that, in his opinion, those who like the idea of Reconquista is because they 
love Spain, while those who call it into question no suelen molestarse en disimular su 
desafecto hacia la España que fue su resultado.94
On the other hand, his active membership in one of the most influential Spanish 
Catholic lobbies, the so-called “Catholic Association of Propagandists”, provides him 
with a platform in which he routinely promotes his academic (?) publications.95 
Actually, one of his books advocates for a delusional return to providentialism 
as the driving force of human history.96 To sum up, other than following Fanjul’s 
steps, Sánchez Saus embodies more faithfully than anyone else in current Spanish 
scholarship the National Catholic tradition.97
Beyond his influence in the mass media and in conservative historical writing, 
Fanjul has become in recent years a pundit and an essential scholarly reference 
for far-right political organizations. This is evident, for instance, with regard 
to National Democracy, an openly xenophobic and Islamophobic group, albeit 
politically irrelevant in the current political Spanish context, which immediately 
posted on its website98 Fanjul’s favourable consideration of Spain as a nation shaped 
against Islam.99 As already mentioned, this idea represents the cornerstone of the 
traditional Reconquista paradigm and provides a common ground shared by all 
Spanish conservative ideological landscape. 
Over the last years, Vox has emerged as the new and rising brand of Spain’s far-
right. Of late Santiago Abascal, former PP member and founder of Vox, has routinely 
92. “those decades that changed Spain's fate by bringing bread and dignity to Spaniards”. Sánchez Saus, 
Rafael. “Prisioneros del odio”, Diario de Sevilla, 6 September 2018: <https://www.diariodesevilla.es/
opinion/articulos/Prisioneros-odio_0_1279672063.html>. 
93. “A head of State internationally and unanimously recognized over 35 years whose rule gave rise 
to the new Spain that made possible the Parliamentary monarchy, the democratic system and the 
Constitution”. Sánchez Saus, Rafael. “El Valle y la derecha vil”, Diario de Sevilla, 3 October 2019: <https://
www.diariodesevilla.es/opinion/articulos/Valle-derecha-vil_0_1397260337.html>. 
94. “do not usually bother to hide their disaffection towards Spain”. Sánchez Saus, Rafael. “La 
Reconquista”, Diario de Sevilla, 24 October 2019: <https://www.diariodesevilla.es/opinion/articulos/
Reconquista_0_1403559685.html>.
95. “El propagandista Rafael Sánchez Saus presenta su libro ‘Al-Ándalus y la Cruz”: http://www.acdp.
es/_old26062016/?page_id=15656.
96. Sánchez Saus, Rafael. Dios, la historia y el hombre. El progreso divino en la historia. Madrid: Ediciones 
Encuentro, 2018. Very correctly, the publishing house’s website presents the book under the heading of 
“Christian Theology”; see: <https://www.edicionesencuentro.com/libro/dios-la-historia-y-el-hombre/>.
97.García-Sanjuán, Alejandro. “La persistencia del discurso nacionalcatólico sobre el medievo peninsular 
en la historiografía española actual”. Historiografías, revista de historia y teoría, 12 (2016): 132-153.
98. <http://democracianacional.org/dn/espana-se-forja-contra-el-islam-serafin-fanjul/>.
99. Personal interview, online newspaper La Gaceta, 27 February 2016: <https://gaceta.es/noticias/
espana-forja-nacionalmente-islam-27022016-0150>. 
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lionized Fanjul in his social media platforms, tweeting Fanjul’s opinion pieces as they 
appear in Spanish conservative media.100 These pieces frequently deal with commonly 
held anti-Islamic stereotypes, such as the dangers of Muslims’ immigration and their 
abiding reluctance to accept the Western values of freedom and democracy.101
The interest raised by Fanjul’s ideas among far-right political organizations could 
hardly be considered as a sheer coincidence. Much to the contrary, if his approaches 
are appealing it is because they are mutually compatible and because Fanjul’s 
“insights” have the potential to feed far-right ideas. Furthermore, the attraction 
between Fanjul and Vox seems to be mutual. In the early days of Spanish democracy, 
Fanjul was a member of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE)102 although, just as 
many other leftists, he seems to have gone through a dramatic ideological crisis 
at some point. His connection to Vox became narrower in recent years and he 
currently belongs to the advisory board of Denaes, a think-tank aimed at defending 
the Spanish nation that Abascal founded in 2006 and led up until 2014.103
Over the last two years, Vox brought the notion of Reconquista into the Spanish 
political conversation with an unprecedented intensity since the early Francoist 
period. A fair observer must consider this a second phase in the weaponizing process 
of the Reconquista. Much in line with the traditional National Catholic concept, 
Vox currently upholds this notion as a rallying cry to raise and reinforce feelings of 
national identity. Besides and in line with Fanjul, this new political repurposing of 
the notion is similarly framed in the context of the Clash of Civilizations and the 
denigration of Muslim immigration.
Vox kicked off the 2015 campaign in Covadonga,104 the place where allegedly 
Pelagius (the pseudo-mythical first King of Asturias) defeated the Muslims for 
100. @Santi_ABASCAL. “¡Bravo Serafín Fanjul!”, 29 June 2017: <https://twitter.com/Santi_ABASCAL/
status/880333917647196160>; @Santi_ABASCAL. “El experto arabista Serafín Fanjul: ‘No existe el 
deseo de integración entre los musulmanes'”, 3 September 2017: <https://twitter.com/Santi_ABASCAL/
status/904437728548462593>; @Santi_ABASCAL. “‘Un Islam moderado’”. Por Serafín Fanjul. “Que no 
nos culpen a nosotros de cuanto no están dispuestos a hacer: ‘integrarse’”, 28 August 2017: <https://
twitter.com/Santi_ABASCAL/status/902137560461344768>. Similarly, Fanjul has been of late lionized 
by publicists close to Vox, among them, for example, Sánchez-Dragó, Fernando. “Clarividencia de un 
arabista”. El Mundo, 29 June 2016: <https://www.elmundo.es/blogs/elmundo/dragolandia/2016/06/29/
clarividencia-de-un-arabista.html>.
101.Fanjul, Serafín. “No quiero ser dhimmí”. ABC, 3 February 2006.
102. Apparently, Fanjul drop out the Communist Party due to his disagreement with the leadership 
regarding North African (Maghreb) politics, as revealed in his public resignation letter: “Carta abierta 
a Manuel Azcárate, secretario de relaciones internacionales. La política norteafricana del Partido 
Comunista”, Diario 16. Digital copy in: Archivo Linz de la Transición Española. Fundación Juan March: 
<http://linz.march.es/Documento.asp?Reg=r-13618>. In the early 1980s, Fanjul held ideas totally 
contrary to those he defends currently: he railed against el prejuicio antiárabe, tan fácil de detectar entre 
intelectuales y universitarios españoles, arranca de aquella unificación por decreto de los Reyes Católicos, Cisneros, 
Felipe II, etcétera ("the anti-Arab prejudice, so clearly visible among intellectuals and Spanish scholars, 
caused by the unification imposed by the Catholic Monarchs, Cisneros, Philip II, etc."). Fanjul, Serafín. 
“Latinidad y arabismo en el Norte de África”. El País, 2 May 1980.
103. <https://nacionespanola.org/fundacion-denaes/patronato-de-honor/serafin-fanjul/>.
104. Abascal. Santiago. “¿Por qué arrancamos en Covadonga?”, Libertad Digital, 29 November 2015: 
<https://www.libertaddigital.com/opinion/santiago-abascal/por-que-arrancamos-en-covadonga-77406/>. 
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the first time after their arrival to Iberia in 711. Vox repeated the same strategy 
in the last campaign (2019), apparently trying to turn Covadonga into a sort of 
sacred national ground.105. In line with far-right claims, current National Catholic 
scholarship remains faithful to the idea of Pelagius as Reconquista first hero and 
Covadonga as the cradle of the Spanish nation.106
Any opportunity to present the Reconquista as the origins of the Spanish nation 
has been seized upon by Vox in the past few years,107 especially on the occasion 
of the Taking of Granada, whose public and official commemoration takes place 
every January 2. In 2018 Abascal posted in his personal twitter feed: El 2 de enero 
de 1492 concluyó la reconquista con la #TomaDeGranada derrotando así al último reducto 
islamista de nuestro suelo. Siglos después permanece el orgullo imborrable por una gesta de 
7 siglos. Y permanece la determinación de no someternos al Islam #EspañaEsReconquista.108 
In a similar vein, the official twitter feed of the organization posted the following in 
January 2, 2019: No queremos, ni debemos olvidar, que hoy hace 527 años de la liberación 
He explains the reasons for such election: “Covadonga is the heart of our nation, our culture, our traditions, 
and values”.
105. González, Miguel. “Abascal lanza desde Covadonga su cruzada contra separatistas y ‘progres’”. 
El País, 13 April 2019: <https://elpais.com/politica/2019/04/12/actualidad/1555085458_659820.html>.
106. Fruto de todo ello fue la manifestación de esa ya por entonces vieja conciencia de continuidad con el pasado de la 
Hispania visigótica, expresada por Alfonso III en la asunción de títulos como Totius Hispaniae Imperator o Hispaniae 
Rex en tiempos que, por vez primera, quedaba expresada la voluntad de atisbar el desvanecimiento el poder islámico 
sobre España ("As a consequence, King Alfonso III affirmed the old self-consciousness of continuity 
with the Visigothic past by adopting titles such as Totius Hispaniae Imperator or Hispaniae Rex, in times 
when, for the first time, the wish to glimpse the fading of the Islamic power over Spain was evident"). 
Sánchez Saus, Rafael. “Covadonga y su sentido, 718-2018”. ABC, 14 September 2018. As shown by De 
Ayala, Carlos. “Realidad y percepción...”: 212, the documents mentioning King Alfonso III (866-910) as 
Totius Hispaniae Imperator and Hispaniae Rex are false. Similarly, Manuel Alejandro Rodríguez de la Peña 
brands Covadonga a crucial event, the first link in the chain of events leading to the Reconquista, which 
in turn he considers el germen de la historia de España (“the origin of the history of Spain”). Barreira, 
David. “Ni Covadonga fue una gran batalla, ni El Cid el héroe cristiano: caen todos los mitos de la 
Reconquista”. El Español, 21 October 2019: <https://www.elespanol.com/cultura/historia/20191021/
covadonga-batalla-cid-heroe-cristiano-mitos-reconquista/437707481_0.html>. Rodríguez de la Peña 
holds an appointment as Medieval History lecturer at Universidad CEU San Pablo, a private Catholic 
university in which a course on Historia de la España de la Reconquista is taught, while undergraduates 
are not offered either specific courses on Islamic history nor al-Andalus. See: <https://www.uspceu.
com/Portals/0/docs/oferta-academica/grados/grado-en-historia/plan-2009/plan-estudios-2019-historia.
pdf?ver=2019-09-18-115826-607>.
107. The incendiary historical rhetoric unfolded by Vox over the course of the 2019 campaign was 
centered on, but not limited to the Reconquista, since it likewise included ‘A comprehensive plan for 
studying, disseminating and protecting the national identity and the contribution of Spain to human 
civilization and universal history, with a special focus on the deeds and feats of our national heroes’: see 
“100 medidas para la España Viva”: <https://www.voxespana.es/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/100medi
dasngal_101319181010040327.pdf. Number 8>.
108. “On January 2, 1492 the Reconquista finished with the #TomaDeGranada, defeating the last Islamist 
stronghold on our soil. Many centuries later our pride for a seven century-long feat remains. And so does 
our determination not to be subjected to Islam”. @Santi_ABASCAL. "El 2 de enero de 1492 concluyó la 
reconquista con la #TomaDeGranada derrotando así al último reducto islamista de nuestro suelo. Siglos 
después permanece el orgullo imborrable por una gesta de 7 siglos. Y permanece la determinación de 
no someternos al Islam #EspañaesReconquista", 2 January 2018: <https://twitter.com/Santi_ABASCAL/
status/948164179080466432>.
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de Granada por las tropas españolas de los Reyes Católicos, poniendo fin a ocho largos siglos 
de Reconquista contra el invasor musulmán.109
One of the most stunning moments of the 2018 Andalusian campaign  was a video 
in which Abascal appears on horseback leading his followers across the landscape of 
Southern Spain with the musical background of the soundtrack of Lord of the rings.110 
Vox’s unremitting rhetoric of Reconquista paid off in the Andalusian elections. 
Therefore, it is no wonder that they followed the same path after the elections, 
claiming the Day of Andalusia to be changed to January 2 in commemoration of the 
end of the Reconquista.111 
Resorting to the medieval past as an instrument of political propaganda represents 
a consolidated strategy in American white nationalism, as evidenced by the case 
of S. Bannon, apparently influenced in this regard by Russian publicist Aleksandr 
Dugin.112 Vox chief strategist, Rafael Bardají, not only publicly acknowledges 
Bannon’s ideological advice on Spanish alt-right,113 but he enthusiastically embraces 
the idea of Spain as a nation shaped against Islam, with the taking of Granada as 
a milestone in that historical process.114 It would be certainly difficult to ascertain 
to what extent the intense unfolding of the Reconquista rhetoric by Vox could be 
interpreted as the result of Bannon’s strategic advice, although Duke’s tweet looks 
like another hint pointing in that direction.
Besides serving as an ideological instrument to foster the idea of a national 
unity shaped in the fight against Islam, the rhetoric of the Reconquista represents 
likewise an effective argument against immigration, as Abascal himself showed 
when claiming that Spain is immunized (“vaccinated”, literally) against Muslim 
immigration thanks to the Reconquista.115
It is worth mentioning that in places where Vox gained political responsibilities, 
their actions confirm their ideology. In Cadrete (Saragossa) they withdraw a bust 
109. “We do not want to, nor should we forget that today marks 527 years of Granada's liberation by 
the Spanish troops of the Catholic Monarchs, putting an end to eight long centuries of Reconquista 
against the Muslim invader”. @vox_es. “No queremos, ni debemos olvidar, que hoy hace 527 años de 
la liberación de Granada por las tropas españolas de los Reyes Católicos, poniendo fin a ocho largos 
siglos de Reconquista contra el invasor musulmán”, 2 January 2019:  <https://twitter.com/vox_es/
status/1080418155992940545>.
110. @voxnoticias_es. “La Reconquista comenzará en tierras andaluzas", 12 November 2018: <https://
twitter.com/voxnoticias_es/status/1061917901031129088>.
111. “Vox pide que Día de Andalucía sea el 2 de enero por el fin de la Reconquista”. eldiario.es, 8 January 
2019: <https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Vox-Dia-Andalucia-enero-Reconquista_0_854965203.html>.
112. Hawk, Brandon W. “Why far-right nationalists like Steve Bannon have embraced a Russian 
ideologue”. The Washington Post, 16 April 2019: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/04/16/
why-far-right-nationalists-like-steve-bannon-have-embraced-russian-ideologue/>.
113. See Bannon’s interview in Verdú, Daniel. “Entrevista/Steve Bannon”. El País, 25 March 2019: 
<https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/03/24/actualidad/1553454729_290547.html>.
114. “Rafael Bardají, ideólogo de Vox: ‘Coincidimos con Trump, no con Le Pen’”. El Mundo, 4 February 
2019: <https://www.elmundo.es/espana/2019/02/04/5c573d29fc6c8355328b4619.html>.
115. “Abascal afirma que España ‘fue vacunada contra la inmigración islámica’ durante la Reconquista”. 
ABC, 22 September 2019: https://www.abc.es/espana/abci-abascal-afirma-espana-vacunada-contra-
inmigracion-islamica-durante-reconquista-201909221352_noticia.html.
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of Abd al-Rahman III from the public spot where it was exhibited116 and in Badajoz 
they claimed to replace the so-called Almossassa (which celebrates the foundation 
of the city by the Muslims in 875) by the commemoration of its taking by King 
Alfonso IX of León in 1231.117
The examples mentioned so far reveal that Vox has gained political benefit from 
the myths that many Spaniards have held, and continue to hold, about themselves 
and about their collective past. Although Vox has been very vocal in the Reconquista 
rhetoric, they are not alone in this endeavor: it has in fact swept like a wildfire 
across all conservative political landscape in Spain. Again on the occasion of 
January 2, Esperanza Aguirre, former senior member of the Popular Party (PP), 
Minister of Education and Culture with Aznar (1996-1999) and ex-president of the 
Autonomous Community of Madrid (2003-2012), posted on social networks that 
the taking of Granada was un día gloria para las españolas (“a glorious day for Spanish 
women”) because, under Islam, they would not have had freedom.118 Aguirre’s 
tweet is a glaring example of how right-wing politicians are consistently using social 
networks to weaponize historical knowledge, advancing passionately-held but often 
loopy notions about the past. In this case, Aguirre presented Islam as an oppressive 
system for women and the Christian conquest as a moment of liberation, apparently 
turning the Catholic Monarchs into feminist activists.
Following the path set by Vox, PP’s current leader (Pablo Casado) likewise 
jumped on the bandwagon of the Reconquista rhetoric. In the context of a visit to 
Oviedo, the capital city of the old Kingdom of Asturias, Casado did not miss the 
opportunity provided by such a matchless historical setting and posted the following 
text in his social media, together with a picture of the cross of the Victory, one of 
the main symbols of the Asturian monarchy: Hoy he podido ver la Cruz de la Victoria 
que está en la Catedral de Oviedo, una joya emblema de la Reconquista. Vamos a empezar 
la reconquista de España, la de un gobierno sensato que defienda la unidad nacional, la 
creación de empleo y la preservación del Estado del Bienestar.119As Sarah Pearce pointed 
116. Civieta, Óscar F. “Un concejal de Vox retira un busto de Abderraman III de una plaza de la localidad 
zaragozana de Cadrete”. eldiario.es, 18 June 2019: <https://www.eldiario.es/aragon/politica/Retiran-
Cadrete-Zaragoza-Abderraman-III_0_911309214.html>.
117. Romero, Rocío. “Vox quiere cambiar Almossassa por un homenaje a la conquista cristiana de 
Badajoz”. Hoy. Diario de Extremadura, 26 September 2019: <https://www.hoy.es/badajoz/quiere-cambiar-
almossassa-20190925212129-nt.html>.
118. @EsperanzAguirre. “Hoy hace 525 años de la toma de Granada por los Reyes Católicos. Es un día 
gloria para las españolas. Con el Islam no tendríamos libertad”, 2 January 2017: <https://twitter.com/
esperanzaguirre/status/815942890857885696?lang=es>. The belief in an unbroken continuity between 
medieval Reconquista and modern values of freedom and democracy is a common ground shared by 
Spanish conservative outlets of all stripes. According to philosopher Ignacio Gómez de Liaño, Europe 
got to Humanism and democracy thanks to the Reconquista; see: Landaluce, Emilia. “Los intelectuales y 
España/Ignacio Gómez de Liaño”. El Mundo, 22 July 2017: <https://www.elmundo.es/opinion/2017/07/
22/59723b8d22601ddf068b45bd.html>.
119. “Today at Oviedo's Cathedral I have had the opportunity to watch the Cross of the Victory, a jewel 
and a symbol of the Reconquista. We are going to start the reconquest of Spain with a sensible government 
that upholds national unity, job creation, and welfare state”. @pablocasado. “Hoy he podido ver la Cruz 
de la Victoria que está en la Catedral de Oviedo, una joya emblema de la Reconquista. Vamos a empezar 
Imago TemporIs. medIum aevum, XIV (2020): 133-162 / ISSN 1888-3931 / DOI 10.21001/itma.2020.14.04
AlejAndro GArcíA-SAnjuán160
out in her aforementioned article, “by creating a revised version of medieval history, 
modern politicians can lead their supporters to believe that there is greater historical 
precedent for their ideas —racist or otherwise— than there ever really was”.120
Casado’s tweet suggests that the current nationalist surge in Spain has prompted 
a sort of ‘competitive outbidding’ between right-wing politicians trying to outdo 
one another as defenders of the Reconquista. Actually, Vox immediately reacted to 
Casados’ tweet by posting a rather laughable picture of Abascal leaning out a window 
with his gaze lost to the horizon and wearing a conquistador helmet, accompanied 
with the following text: Pablo, no das el perfil para apuntarte a la vanguardia de la 
reconquista como nuestro presidente @Santi_ABASCAL, pero sigue intentándolo.121
As we have seen thus far, the political repurposing of the Reconquista represents 
an ever growing tendency among right-wing representatives of all stripes in 
contemporary Spain. I will mention one last example, taken again from social 
media. On the occasion of the 2017 terrorist attacks in Barcelona and following the 
example set by Aznar in 2004, a well-known conservative journalist tweeted out a 
startling message connecting jihadist terrorism and medieval Iberian history. After 
cursing the terrorists, she wrote: Ya os echamos de aquí una vez y volveremos a hacerlo.122 
Much like Aznar’s Georgetown lecture, this statement equates the Muslims of al-
Andalus with 21st-century jihadist terrorists and, by doing so the author framed the 
Reconquista narrative in the context of the Clash of Civilizations rhetoric, turning it 
into an effective Islamophobic trope.
The unremitting political repurposing of the Reconquista prompted the reaction 
of different Spanish historians with critical opinion pieces123 and statements in 
the media124 against the manipulation and distortion of the past. However, not 
la reconquista de España, la de un gobierno sensato que defienda la unidad nacional, la creación de 
empleo y la preservación del Estado del Bienestar”, 5 March 2019: <https://twitter.com/pablocasado_/
status/1102990243299512320>.
120. Pearce, Sarah. “The Medieval Fantasy...”.
121. “Pablo, unlike our president@Santi_Abascal, you do not have the right profile to be at the forefront 
of the Reconquista, but keep trying”. @vox_es. “Pablo, no das el perfil para apuntarte a la vanguardia de 
la reconquista como nuestro presidente @Santi_ABASCAL, pero sigue intentándolo”, 6 March 2019: 
<https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1103337441723904000>.
122. “We already kicked you out of here once and we will do it again”. @isanseba. “Malditos seáis, 
islamistas hijos de... Ya os echamos de aquí una vez y volveremos a hacerlo. España será occidental, libre 
y democrática”, 17 August 2017:. <https://twitter.com/isanseba/status/898252410396606464>.
123. Álvarez Junco, José. “La Reconquista”. El País, 27 January 2019: <https://elpais.com/
elpais/2019/01/25/opinion/1548436799_019300.html>. García-Sanjuán, Alejandro. “Vox, la 
Reconquista y la salvación de España”. eldiario.es, 5 December 2018: <https://www.eldiario.es/andalucia/
enabierto/elecciones_en_Andalucia_2018-reconquista-Vox_6_843125717.html>.
124. Moreno, Aristóteles. “¿Por qué Vox rescata ahora el viejo concepto de ‘Reconquista’?”. Público, 
15 January 2019 (including opinions of José Álvarez Junco, Carlos de Ayala and Alejandro García-
Sanjuán): https://www.publico.es/politica/ultraderecha-vox-rescata-viejo-concepto-reconquista.
html; García Rey, Marcos. “Vox y la Reconquista en las elecciones: ‘Don Pelayo era un tío con dos 
huevos’”. El Confidencial, 12 April 2019 (Eduardo Manzano, Carlos de Ayala and Alejandro García-
Sanjuán): <https://www.elconfidencial.com/cultura/2019-04-12/vox-reconquista-andalus-historia-
desproposito_1938810/>; Rodríguez Blanco, Patricia. “La idea de la Reconquista es ‘falsa’ y ‘manipulada’, 
según los expertos”. El País, 12 April 2019 (José Álvarez Junco, José Luis Corral and Alejandro García-
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all scholars held critical opinions.125 At the same time, alt-right journalists also 
contributed with opinion pieces backing Vox and his Reconquista rhetoric126 and, in 
one particular case, criticism of Reconquista was interpreted as an expression of the 
allegedly rising tendency to “soften” history by dodging its most fraught events and, 
as such, as a danger for young scholars.127
My last two remarks are devoted to the most recent, shocking and dramatic events 
connected to the weaponizing of the Reconquista. In these cases, unfortunately, 
this idea is not just a simple literary trope, but rather a tragic reality with highly 
painful consequences. In July 2011, Norwegian fascist terrorist Anders Breivik 
killed 77 members of the Workers Youth League, Norway’s largest political youth 
organization, closely associated with the Labour Party. Breivik set out his xenophobic 
ideas in a series of texts entitled 2083: A Declaration of European Independence which 
he released the same day of the attacks and in which he mentions 14 times the 
notion of Reconquista in the framework of his anti-Islamic historical rhetoric.128 The 
most recent case concerns the pseudo-mythical first Asturian King Pelagius, whose 
name (spelled as Pelayu) was inscribed in the gun charger of the Australian terrorist 
who killed 50 people in two New Zealand mosques in March 2019.129
Sanjuán): <https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/04/11/hechos/1554980000_022524.html>. Vox responded 
to this last information in his twitter feed: No nos molesta que el Grupo Prisa haga vídeos de campaña contra 
nosotros, es más nos divierte y nos beneficia. Pero no aceptamos que escupa sobre España negando la Reconquista. 
Es falso y ridículo y demuestra muy poco amor por nuestra nación (“It does not bother us that the Prisa Group 
makes campaign videos against us, in fact, it amuses and benefits us. But we do not accept that they spit 
on Spain denying the Reconquista. It is false and ridiculous and shows very little love for our nation”). 
@vox_es. “No nos molesta que el Grupo Prisa haga vídeos de campaña contra nosotros, es más nos 
divierte y nos beneficia. Pero no aceptamos que escupa sobre España negando la Reconquista. Es falso y 
ridículo y demuestra muy poco amor por nuestra nación”, 15 April 2019: <https://twitter.com/vox_es/
status/1117738180051124224>; Altares, Guillermo. “Why the Middle Ages have become incredibly 
relevant”. El País (English version), 1 August 2019 (Maribel Fierro and Eduardo Manzano): <https://
elpais.com/elpais/2019/08/01/inenglish/1564673082_675360.html>.
125. García de Castro, César. “Pelayo y los propagandistas”. El Mundo, 25 April 2019: <https://www.
elmundo.es/opinion/2019/04/25/5cc0a1e6fdddff062e8b46f8.html>.
126. Jiménez Losantos, Federico. “La Fiscalía contra la Reconquista”. Libertad Digital, 7 April 2019: <https://
www.libertaddigital.com/opinion/federico-jimenez-losantos/la-fiscalia-contra-la-reconquista-87588/>; 
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The terrorist attacks of Norway (2011) and New Zealand (2019) are so far the last 
stages in the weaponizing process of the Reconquista which, for the second time in 
history, has been turned into a fascist terrorist weapon. As we saw above, Francoists 
used it to legitimate the killing of “bad Spaniards”, basically all those who were 
not Francoists. At the beginnings of the 21st century and thanks to the Clash of 
Civilizations doctrine, the weapon has become global and its potential targets have 
been widened, including now all those who do not fit in self-proclaimed Western 
values, whether leftists (enemies of liberal capitalism) or Muslims (enemies of 
Judeo-Christian civilization).
6. Final remarks
The Reconquista first grew within the framework of Spanish 19th-century 
nationalism. Although working primarily as an ideological concept, it drew solid 
credentials thanks to its scholarly origins, a legitimacy-lending factor that has 
proven crucial for the unbroken continuity of the notion over the last 150 years. 
Realizing its substantial political potential, Franco weaponized the Reconquista for 
the first time against the background of National Catholicism. At the same time, 
Sánchez-Albornoz, considered by significant sectors of Spanish scholarship as the 
best Spanish historian of his time and who was politically contrary to Francoism, 
raised the Reconquista to the highest possible scholarly rank.
With the arrival of democracy in 1978, most of the Spanish academics decided 
that the Reconquista no longer stood for a National Catholic concept. On the other 
hand, these sectors likewise thought that, since it represented a consolidated and 
useful scholarly notion, a neutral, unloaded and non-ideological rendering of the 
Reconquista was, not only a desirable but also a clearly feasible option. However, in 
the best case, this option turned out merely wishful thinking and, in the worst, a 
clever strategy to secure the continuity of the concept. Reconquista is intrinsically 
ideological and, therefore, a neutral version seems rather difficult to achieve. On 
the other hand, the most conservative sectors are openly reluctant to admit such an 
unloaded (and therefore, useless) rendering of the Reconquista.
The narrative of the Reconquista is the product of 19th century Spanish nationalist 
scholarship and, as such, the current continuity of this approach to the medieval 
past of Iberia represents a glaring anachronism. However, the examples so far 
mentioned clearly reveal that, although an unsuited term, Reconquista continues to 
enjoy wide acceptance in the most conservative academic and political outlets. On 
the other hand, the Reconquista not only represents a highly biased and distorting 
academic approach, but also a powerful ideological concept heavily loaded with 
a potentially toxic and threatening burden. Therefore, the Reconquista paradigm 
remains currently an academic challenge that historians must address from a 
critical perspective with the aim of producing an unbiased historical narrative free 
of nationalist romantic stereotypes and more committed to academic knowledge.
